The F-35 as a Subscription Service
Reverse Engineering, Source Code, and Control
- Commenters note that the real value of the F‑35 is its software and networked intelligence, not just the airframe.
- Reverse‑engineering is seen as technically possible but extremely hard: ~10M LOC, anti‑tamper protections, specialized hardware.
- Israel is cited as a special case: instead of reverse‑engineering, it negotiated rights/access to modify software and integrate its own systems.
- Some argue that trying to clone the F‑35 would be harder than building a new fighter informed by its concepts.
Alliances, Trust, and U.S. Reliability
- A major theme is fear that U.S. political swings make it an unreliable defense partner.
- Examples raised: restrictions on Ukrainian F‑16 support, blocked or constrained re‑exports (e.g., Gripen components), past embargoes on Iran/Venezuela.
- Some say this is normal export‑control behavior and that NATO under‑spenders took a calculated risk relying on U.S. kit.
- Others respond that Trump‑era behavior crosses into “kill switch” territory and destroys long‑term confidence.
Operational Fit and Canada/Finland Debates
- Several posts argue the F‑35 is ill‑suited for Canada’s needs (little contested airspace, huge distances, limited bases), suggesting a long‑range interceptor would be better.
- Counterpoints: Canada’s fighter choices are about coalition operations with the U.S., not pure homeland defense.
- Finland’s recent F‑35 purchase is now viewed by some as a risky bet on U.S. consistency; official statements downplay concern but are seen as constrained by politics.
Maintenance, Kill Switches, and the “Subscription” Model
- The article’s “subscription” framing resonates: high ongoing dependence on U.S. software updates, parts, and intelligence.
- F‑35s reportedly need ~5 maintenance hours per flight hour; being cut off from spares or software would quickly ground fleets.
- Commenters distinguish between literal remote kill switches and more subtle leverage: withholding EW updates, parts, or configuration data.
Broader Tech and Strategic Autonomy
- Several draw parallels to commercial aviation (engines sold cheap, profits in maintenance) and to phones/Teslas with locked features.
- This prompts worries about any U.S. tech: if F‑35 support can be throttled, why not cloud services, phones, or OSes in a crisis?
- Many see this as a catalyst for Europe (and others) to invest in their own fighters (Typhoon successors, Gripen, Rafale, Tempest) and reduce U.S. components.
Nuclear Deterrence and Security Guarantees
- A long sub‑thread debates whether Ukraine giving up inherited nukes was a mistake and whether that lesson will drive new proliferation.
- Some argue nukes are now the only reliable deterrent; others stress the practical impossibility and risks of many more nuclear states.