Banning E2EE is stupid
Proposals to ban or weaken end-to-end encryption (E2EE) are criticized as both technically futile and harmful to ordinary users’ privacy and security. Commenters argue that criminals and sophisticated actors will easily layer their own encryption or steganography over monitored channels, while law-abiding citizens, children, and political dissidents are left more exposed to abuse, surveillance, and data breaches. Some see these efforts less as genuine child-protection or law-enforcement tools and more as power grabs that risk normalizing mass surveillance without clear evidence of public-safety benefits.
Effectiveness of Banning E2EE
- Many agree E2EE is crucial and banning it would be futile: competent criminals can layer their own encryption over any channel or use steganography.
- Others argue “futility” is a weak or flawed argument: lots of things are banned despite being technically easy to do; the core case should be about rights, safety, and proportionality.
- Some expect partial measures, not a literal total ban: backdoored/top-10 apps, lawful intercept mandates, or making provider-operated E2EE unusable as a legal defense.
Law Enforcement vs Privacy and Security
- One side stresses law enforcement already works around encryption and offers little evidence that E2EE truly impairs its mission.
- Critics emphasize the historical abuse of surveillance powers and argue that making police work “too easy” leads toward a police state.
- Technical backdoors are seen as national-security risks: they become high-value targets for hostile states, insiders, and criminals.
Children, CSAM, and Emotional Framing
- “Protect the children / fight terrorism” is seen as the main political justification and a powerful emotional lever.
- Multiple comments argue banning E2EE can harm children: exposing them to predators, overbroad CSAM flags, and life-ruining false positives.
- Some insist privacy advocates rarely offer convincing “protect the children” answers; others counter with parental controls and education instead of mass scanning.
Circumvention and Outlawing Secrets
- If mainstream E2EE is weakened, homemade crypto or extra layers will become suspicious and may be criminalized.
- This suggests a trajectory toward outlawing “having secrets” at all; people fear totalitarian control rather than genuine crime prevention.
- Steganography and LLM-generated cover traffic are cited as future methods to hide encrypted content, though their robustness is debated.
Political Incentives and Public Discourse
- Legislators are portrayed as wanting to be seen catching criminals, not necessarily to be effective.
- There is disagreement over whether they are ignorant, sincerely concerned, or primarily seeking more power.
- Several comments argue technical, logical explanations are not enough; emotional and historical arguments (authoritarianism, future fascists, Eastern Bloc experience) may resonate more.
Practical Impact on Ordinary Users
- Concerns include: chilling effects, criminalizing ordinary behavior (e.g., teens sexting), and pushing people to grey/black-market apps and OSes.
- Some note most users lack strong OPSEC; even imperfect anti-encryption laws may “work” by catching many unsophisticated targets while eroding everyone’s safety.