Sweden has long opposed nuclear weapons, but once tried to build them

Sweden’s nuclear program and legacy

• Beyond the article, commenters note Sweden’s planned supersonic nuclear bomber (SAAB 36) and its resemblance to aircraft like the SR‑71.
• Sweden transferred remaining plutonium to the US roughly a decade ago; debated as security precaution vs. potential “plausible deniability” if any was retained.
• Legends persist about hidden fissile material or “bomb kits” in Swedish mountains; one anecdote describes plutonium informally hand‑carried to Norway to bypass bureaucracy.
• A side thread discusses a nuclear physics book with notes, clippings, and a poem linked to Sweden’s program, possibly owned by a scientist; suggestion to contact science historians.

Deterrence, shelters, and first‑strike logic

• One view: it’s easier to build civil shelters if you clearly lack first‑strike capability, since shelters plus first‑strike forces look escalatory.
• Another view: shelters for fallout and wide‑area attacks differ from hardened bunkers for command centers; lacking first‑strike may delay you becoming a target.
• Personal anecdotes: some have nearby bunkers (e.g., central Europe), others are too far away and expect to “shelter in place.”

Latent nuclear powers and ramp time

• Several states are labeled “threshold/latent” nuclear powers: e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Iran, European and American countries, South Korea; Gulf states are pursuing enrichment.
• Claim: with strong civilian nuclear and space programs, ramp‑up to weapons could be weeks to months, especially with fast breeder reactors.
• Others question this, citing the time to build enrichment and technical components such as explosive lenses; responses say these designs are now widely understood.
• Japan is highlighted as having large stocks of separated reactor‑grade plutonium and capable rocketry; reactor‑grade plutonium is argued to be usable for weapons.

Ukraine, disarmament, and lessons learned

• Strong theme: Ukraine’s post‑Soviet disarmament is seen by many as a mistake; nukes might have deterred Russia.
• Counterpoints: Ukraine lacked launch control, would have faced high maintenance costs, internal instability, and strong international pressure or sanctions.
• Some argue Ukraine had the industrial base to re‑engineer control systems and could at least have become a nuclear‑threshold state.
• Broader point: security guarantees (Budapest Memorandum) are viewed as having failed, pushing other states toward seeking their own deterrent.

Other disarmament cases (South Africa, Libya, Kazakhstan)

• South Africa is cited as a positive disarmament example due to fears of civil war; nukes might have worsened internal risk.
• Libya is raised as a cautionary tale: giving up its program was followed by NATO intervention; interpreted as reinforcing “keep your nukes.”
• Kazakhstan’s voluntary renunciation is described as “the only sane way” given risk of sanctions and instability.

Proliferation vs. restraint: should everyone have nukes?

• One camp argues every state “must” or “should” get nukes; only mutually assured destruction reliably deters aggression, especially after Ukraine and Libya.
• Others warn universal proliferation would be catastrophic, especially with accidents, extremist groups, or unstable regimes.
• Debate over game theory: some see multi‑polar nuclear worlds as unstable/metastable; others say long‑term equilibrium is either nobody or everybody having nukes, but prefer the former.
• Moral disputes arise over whether nukes would have prevented US‑led wars (Iraq, Afghanistan) or simply produced even worse outcomes.

NATO, US guarantees, and European security

• Several comments argue NATO’s nuclear umbrella has reduced proliferation in Europe: many members forgo their own nukes and “rely on alliances instead.”
• Concerns grow about US deterrence credibility and political shifts; this spurs nuclear debates in countries like Germany and Poland and speculation about future European arsenals.
• Some suggest tolerating “low” conventional contributions within NATO is worthwhile if it suppresses independent nuclear programs.
• Others note renewed NATO spending commitments since 2014 and argue that if US backing weakens further, more regional powers (Europe, East Asia, Middle East) will seek nuclear options.