Sweden has long opposed nuclear weapons, but once tried to build them

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Sweden’s once-secret effort to build nuclear weapons, despite its modern anti-nuclear stance, prompts a broader look at how smaller and medium powers think about deterrence, security guarantees, and dependence on alliances like NATO. Commenters connect Sweden’s choices to “threshold” nuclear states such as Japan and Germany, the transfer and control of fissile material, and Cold War-era delivery systems. The thread repeatedly returns to Ukraine and Libya as cautionary examples, arguing over whether giving up nuclear arsenals made them more vulnerable and whether widespread proliferation is an inevitable or catastrophic response to unreliable security assurances.

Sweden’s nuclear program and legacy

  • Beyond the article, commenters note Sweden’s planned supersonic nuclear bomber (SAAB 36) and its resemblance to aircraft like the SR‑71.
  • Sweden transferred remaining plutonium to the US roughly a decade ago; debated as security precaution vs. potential “plausible deniability” if any was retained.
  • Legends persist about hidden fissile material or “bomb kits” in Swedish mountains; one anecdote describes plutonium informally hand‑carried to Norway to bypass bureaucracy.
  • A side thread discusses a nuclear physics book with notes, clippings, and a poem linked to Sweden’s program, possibly owned by a scientist; suggestion to contact science historians.

Deterrence, shelters, and first‑strike logic

  • One view: it’s easier to build civil shelters if you clearly lack first‑strike capability, since shelters plus first‑strike forces look escalatory.
  • Another view: shelters for fallout and wide‑area attacks differ from hardened bunkers for command centers; lacking first‑strike may delay you becoming a target.
  • Personal anecdotes: some have nearby bunkers (e.g., central Europe), others are too far away and expect to “shelter in place.”

Latent nuclear powers and ramp time

  • Several states are labeled “threshold/latent” nuclear powers: e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Iran, European and American countries, South Korea; Gulf states are pursuing enrichment.
  • Claim: with strong civilian nuclear and space programs, ramp‑up to weapons could be weeks to months, especially with fast breeder reactors.
  • Others question this, citing the time to build enrichment and technical components such as explosive lenses; responses say these designs are now widely understood.
  • Japan is highlighted as having large stocks of separated reactor‑grade plutonium and capable rocketry; reactor‑grade plutonium is argued to be usable for weapons.

Ukraine, disarmament, and lessons learned

  • Strong theme: Ukraine’s post‑Soviet disarmament is seen by many as a mistake; nukes might have deterred Russia.
  • Counterpoints: Ukraine lacked launch control, would have faced high maintenance costs, internal instability, and strong international pressure or sanctions.
  • Some argue Ukraine had the industrial base to re‑engineer control systems and could at least have become a nuclear‑threshold state.
  • Broader point: security guarantees (Budapest Memorandum) are viewed as having failed, pushing other states toward seeking their own deterrent.

Other disarmament cases (South Africa, Libya, Kazakhstan)

  • South Africa is cited as a positive disarmament example due to fears of civil war; nukes might have worsened internal risk.
  • Libya is raised as a cautionary tale: giving up its program was followed by NATO intervention; interpreted as reinforcing “keep your nukes.”
  • Kazakhstan’s voluntary renunciation is described as “the only sane way” given risk of sanctions and instability.

Proliferation vs. restraint: should everyone have nukes?

  • One camp argues every state “must” or “should” get nukes; only mutually assured destruction reliably deters aggression, especially after Ukraine and Libya.
  • Others warn universal proliferation would be catastrophic, especially with accidents, extremist groups, or unstable regimes.
  • Debate over game theory: some see multi‑polar nuclear worlds as unstable/metastable; others say long‑term equilibrium is either nobody or everybody having nukes, but prefer the former.
  • Moral disputes arise over whether nukes would have prevented US‑led wars (Iraq, Afghanistan) or simply produced even worse outcomes.

NATO, US guarantees, and European security

  • Several comments argue NATO’s nuclear umbrella has reduced proliferation in Europe: many members forgo their own nukes and “rely on alliances instead.”
  • Concerns grow about US deterrence credibility and political shifts; this spurs nuclear debates in countries like Germany and Poland and speculation about future European arsenals.
  • Some suggest tolerating “low” conventional contributions within NATO is worthwhile if it suppresses independent nuclear programs.
  • Others note renewed NATO spending commitments since 2014 and argue that if US backing weakens further, more regional powers (Europe, East Asia, Middle East) will seek nuclear options.