FireChat was a tool for revolution, then disappeared

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

What Happened to FireChat

  • Several commenters note they assumed FireChat still existed and are surprised it vanished.
  • Some say the service “rebranded” into NewNode, built by much of the same team.
  • Others point out that if FireChat could be shut off centrally in Feb 2020, it was never truly decentralized.
  • Explanations split between mundane “ran out of money / business reasons” and more conspiratorial ideas about state pressure or intelligence ties; no concrete evidence is provided, so the cause remains unclear.

Usability, Architecture, and Platform Constraints

  • Multiple users report FireChat was barely usable: unstable connectivity, broke Wi‑Fi on some Android phones, and initially lacked private messaging.
  • Others say it clearly “worked enough” to generate hype and real-world use, but note that Android/iOS restrictions on radio and background processing limit what such apps can do.
  • Some argue that without OS-level support from Apple/Google, large-scale mesh chat on phones will always be fragile.

Business, Openness, and Trust

  • There is strong frustration that “revolutionary” tools are usually proprietary, with opaque shutdowns and no way to keep using them.
  • Discussion of open source notes its chronically weak marketing and funding, and risk of others monetizing it, while big, well-funded OSS tends to come from corporations.
  • Several commenters stress that closed-source, business-backed “secure” apps are inherently hard to trust; a company can be coerced into adding backdoors.
  • Others counter that even a short-lived tool can help people while it exists.

Successor and Alternative Tools

  • NewNode is presented as FireChat’s successor, offering VPN and messenger; code is on GitHub.
  • Commenters report serious onboarding issues: aggressive CAPTCHAs, SMS codes and phone calls not arriving, and poor UX, leading some to uninstall.
  • Phone-number registration is criticized as weak, government-controllable identity and bad for privacy.
  • Other options mentioned: Meshtastic (LoRa hardware-based), Briar (Android, Bluetooth/Wi‑Fi/Tor, limited mesh via contacts), qaul.net, and non-phone radio tools (LoRa variants, JS8CALL, HF).

Security, Surveillance, and Protest OpSec

  • Many argue that for serious revolutionary work, in-person meetings without electronics are still paramount; technology is an extra attack surface.
  • Others respond that during fast-moving protests some real-time comms are necessary, so tools still matter.
  • Burner phones are discussed: how easy they are to buy anonymously, how traceable they might be via IMEI and store records, and how behavior (shared towers, Wi‑Fi, contacts) can re-identify users.

Mesh Networking and Radio Tech Notes

  • LoRa is highlighted for long-range, low-SNR communication, including operation “below the noise floor”; several comments explain how spread-spectrum and processing gain make that possible, along with its limits.
  • There is concern that real resilience requires more open or dedicated hardware, not tightly controlled consumer smartphones, especially for emergency or censorship-resistant communication.