FireChat was a tool for revolution, then disappeared
Once-popular protest app FireChat, which enabled mesh-based messaging without cell networks, has vanished, prompting speculation over whether it died for mundane business reasons or under political pressure. Commenters contrast its closed, proprietary design with open-source alternatives like Briar, Meshtastic, and NewNode, debating trade-offs in security, usability, hardware requirements, and funding. The conversation broadens into concerns about trust, censorship resistance, and how centralized platforms and app stores limit the practicality of “revolutionary” communications tools.
What Happened to FireChat
- Several commenters note they assumed FireChat still existed and are surprised it vanished.
- Some say the service “rebranded” into NewNode, built by much of the same team.
- Others point out that if FireChat could be shut off centrally in Feb 2020, it was never truly decentralized.
- Explanations split between mundane “ran out of money / business reasons” and more conspiratorial ideas about state pressure or intelligence ties; no concrete evidence is provided, so the cause remains unclear.
Usability, Architecture, and Platform Constraints
- Multiple users report FireChat was barely usable: unstable connectivity, broke Wi‑Fi on some Android phones, and initially lacked private messaging.
- Others say it clearly “worked enough” to generate hype and real-world use, but note that Android/iOS restrictions on radio and background processing limit what such apps can do.
- Some argue that without OS-level support from Apple/Google, large-scale mesh chat on phones will always be fragile.
Business, Openness, and Trust
- There is strong frustration that “revolutionary” tools are usually proprietary, with opaque shutdowns and no way to keep using them.
- Discussion of open source notes its chronically weak marketing and funding, and risk of others monetizing it, while big, well-funded OSS tends to come from corporations.
- Several commenters stress that closed-source, business-backed “secure” apps are inherently hard to trust; a company can be coerced into adding backdoors.
- Others counter that even a short-lived tool can help people while it exists.
Successor and Alternative Tools
- NewNode is presented as FireChat’s successor, offering VPN and messenger; code is on GitHub.
- Commenters report serious onboarding issues: aggressive CAPTCHAs, SMS codes and phone calls not arriving, and poor UX, leading some to uninstall.
- Phone-number registration is criticized as weak, government-controllable identity and bad for privacy.
- Other options mentioned: Meshtastic (LoRa hardware-based), Briar (Android, Bluetooth/Wi‑Fi/Tor, limited mesh via contacts), qaul.net, and non-phone radio tools (LoRa variants, JS8CALL, HF).
Security, Surveillance, and Protest OpSec
- Many argue that for serious revolutionary work, in-person meetings without electronics are still paramount; technology is an extra attack surface.
- Others respond that during fast-moving protests some real-time comms are necessary, so tools still matter.
- Burner phones are discussed: how easy they are to buy anonymously, how traceable they might be via IMEI and store records, and how behavior (shared towers, Wi‑Fi, contacts) can re-identify users.
Mesh Networking and Radio Tech Notes
- LoRa is highlighted for long-range, low-SNR communication, including operation “below the noise floor”; several comments explain how spread-spectrum and processing gain make that possible, along with its limits.
- There is concern that real resilience requires more open or dedicated hardware, not tightly controlled consumer smartphones, especially for emergency or censorship-resistant communication.