Going Dark: The war on encryption is on the rise

EU surveillance legislation and ChatControl

• Discussion centers on renewed EU efforts (e.g., ChatControl) to mandate scanning of private communications, including proposals to rebrand and reintroduce previously stalled bills.
• Key concern: exemption for politicians and police from monitoring, while ordinary citizens are subject to mass scanning.
• Some see clear echoes of past authoritarian systems and a de facto re‑creation of aristocratic privilege. Others object to loaded terms like “Stasi-fans” as unhelpful emotionalization.

Asymmetry: citizens monitored, elites exempt

• Many argue surveillance should target those with power (politicians, police) to reduce corruption, not the general public.
• Fears that “politician/police” status is temporary; people rotate out of these roles but surveillance infrastructure remains.
• Worry that loopholes (e.g., running for minor office) will then be closed by further restrictions on political participation.

Privacy vs security and technical realities

• Several point out that encryption is mathematically binary: either it works or it doesn’t; “privacy-preserving scanning” of E2EE is seen as impossible.
• Strong view: outlawing strong crypto mainly harms law‑abiding users; criminals will still use independent tools, libraries, or side‑loaded apps.
• Counterpoint: states can and do shift focus to endpoints (spyware, client-side scanning) and legal compulsion, as seen in other jurisdictions.
• Debate over how much scale matters: some say breaking WhatsApp/iMessage would roll us back to niche encrypted tools; others respond that even niche tools suffice for motivated criminals.

Surveillance, democracy, and power

• Widespread worry that EU-level decision-making is insulated from voters, with many layers between elections and specific policies.
• Some see U.S. security interests and corporations as key influencers; others stress the EU’s own agency and internal lobbying.
• Broader fear: centralizing data and powers for prosecution without symmetric transparency or tools for defense.

Everyday surveillance and loss of analog options

• Multiple comments note de facto pressure to own smartphones (banking 2FA, government services, menus, payments).
• Some insist analog and paper options still exist; others counter that these are rapidly disappearing, marginalizing those who opt out.
• Corporate surveillance (phones, social media, CDNs) is seen by many as already exceeding classic “1984” scenarios, blurring state–corporate boundaries.

Law enforcement capability and risks to innocents

• One detailed anecdote describes a traumatic CSAM-related raid based on IP evidence, seizure of equipment for months, and no charges.
• The storyteller portrays investigators as technically unsophisticated, overconfident in weak indicators (VMs, MEGA usage, Tor presence), and procedurally unaccountable.
• This is cited as evidence that expanding surveillance will amplify harm to innocents unless paired with far stronger protections and oversight.

Data, profiling, and AI “astrology”

• Concerns that mass data + crude profiling (inspired by past FBI methods) will produce “data-driven astrology”: plausible-sounding but unreliable inferences.
• AI-based enhancement and pattern finding is expected by some to worsen junk science (e.g., hallucinated image “enhancement”), especially when politicians overrule technical experts.

What citizens can do / unresolved issues

• Suggestions include supporting digital rights groups, using VPNs, open-source tools, user-controlled encryption, and even falling back to paper notebooks.
• Nonetheless, there is pessimism: legal compulsion, economic centralization (big platforms, CDNs, clouds), and political incentives may keep pushing toward pervasive surveillance.
• Some explicitly ask how to vote in their own best interest when key decisions are made by relatively insulated institutions, and receive no clear answer.