Going Dark: The war on encryption is on the rise

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Governments in Europe and elsewhere are ramping up efforts to weaken or bypass end‑to‑end encryption, often framed as necessary to fight child abuse and serious crime. Commenters argue that such measures are technically incompatible with true encryption, will mainly erode ordinary citizens’ security and privacy, and create powerful surveillance tools that can be abused or misused—especially when politicians and police seek exemptions for themselves. Many see this as part of a broader trend toward mass surveillance and warn that determined criminals will still access strong encryption, leaving everyone else less safe.

EU surveillance legislation and ChatControl

  • Discussion centers on renewed EU efforts (e.g., ChatControl) to mandate scanning of private communications, including proposals to rebrand and reintroduce previously stalled bills.
  • Key concern: exemption for politicians and police from monitoring, while ordinary citizens are subject to mass scanning.
  • Some see clear echoes of past authoritarian systems and a de facto re‑creation of aristocratic privilege. Others object to loaded terms like “Stasi-fans” as unhelpful emotionalization.

Asymmetry: citizens monitored, elites exempt

  • Many argue surveillance should target those with power (politicians, police) to reduce corruption, not the general public.
  • Fears that “politician/police” status is temporary; people rotate out of these roles but surveillance infrastructure remains.
  • Worry that loopholes (e.g., running for minor office) will then be closed by further restrictions on political participation.

Privacy vs security and technical realities

  • Several point out that encryption is mathematically binary: either it works or it doesn’t; “privacy-preserving scanning” of E2EE is seen as impossible.
  • Strong view: outlawing strong crypto mainly harms law‑abiding users; criminals will still use independent tools, libraries, or side‑loaded apps.
  • Counterpoint: states can and do shift focus to endpoints (spyware, client-side scanning) and legal compulsion, as seen in other jurisdictions.
  • Debate over how much scale matters: some say breaking WhatsApp/iMessage would roll us back to niche encrypted tools; others respond that even niche tools suffice for motivated criminals.

Surveillance, democracy, and power

  • Widespread worry that EU-level decision-making is insulated from voters, with many layers between elections and specific policies.
  • Some see U.S. security interests and corporations as key influencers; others stress the EU’s own agency and internal lobbying.
  • Broader fear: centralizing data and powers for prosecution without symmetric transparency or tools for defense.

Everyday surveillance and loss of analog options

  • Multiple comments note de facto pressure to own smartphones (banking 2FA, government services, menus, payments).
  • Some insist analog and paper options still exist; others counter that these are rapidly disappearing, marginalizing those who opt out.
  • Corporate surveillance (phones, social media, CDNs) is seen by many as already exceeding classic “1984” scenarios, blurring state–corporate boundaries.

Law enforcement capability and risks to innocents

  • One detailed anecdote describes a traumatic CSAM-related raid based on IP evidence, seizure of equipment for months, and no charges.
  • The storyteller portrays investigators as technically unsophisticated, overconfident in weak indicators (VMs, MEGA usage, Tor presence), and procedurally unaccountable.
  • This is cited as evidence that expanding surveillance will amplify harm to innocents unless paired with far stronger protections and oversight.

Data, profiling, and AI “astrology”

  • Concerns that mass data + crude profiling (inspired by past FBI methods) will produce “data-driven astrology”: plausible-sounding but unreliable inferences.
  • AI-based enhancement and pattern finding is expected by some to worsen junk science (e.g., hallucinated image “enhancement”), especially when politicians overrule technical experts.

What citizens can do / unresolved issues

  • Suggestions include supporting digital rights groups, using VPNs, open-source tools, user-controlled encryption, and even falling back to paper notebooks.
  • Nonetheless, there is pessimism: legal compulsion, economic centralization (big platforms, CDNs, clouds), and political incentives may keep pushing toward pervasive surveillance.
  • Some explicitly ask how to vote in their own best interest when key decisions are made by relatively insulated institutions, and receive no clear answer.