macOS Sonoma silently enabled iCloud Keychain despite my precautions

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

A macOS Sonoma bug that silently re-enabled iCloud Keychain for some users, despite it being explicitly turned off, has raised broader concerns about Apple’s privacy posture and software quality. Commenters debate whether this reflects negligence, dark patterns, or unavoidable trade-offs in modern cloud-integrated platforms, and share strategies for minimizing data sent to Apple, including alternative password managers, MDM policies, and even switching to Linux-based systems.

Apple’s Privacy Posture and Trust

  • Many see Apple’s “we take privacy seriously” as mostly marketing, especially given incidents like PRISM participation and past on-device scanning proposals.
  • Others argue Apple has made real trade-offs (reduced functionality for privacy), and that dismissing it as “only marketing” is overly cynical.
  • Distinction is made between trusting Apple’s intent (not nefarious) vs. trusting the security of any cloud service, including Apple’s.

iCloud Keychain Bug and User Responsibility

  • Core complaint: macOS Sonoma appears to have silently re‑enabled iCloud Keychain despite it being explicitly disabled.
  • Some blame the user for being signed into an Apple account at all; others note valid reasons (Find My, App Store, development, testing) that don’t imply consent to cloud-syncing passwords.
  • A recurring frustration: “off” toggles not being honored, and settings reverting to less private defaults, likened to similar behavior on Windows.
  • Debate over incompetence vs. intentional dark patterns; repeated similar “bugs” make some doubt it’s accidental.

Platform Trade-offs and Threat Models

  • Some argue that if one fundamentally distrusts Apple, they shouldn’t use its platform for sensitive data at all.
  • Counterpoint: one can trust Apple more than many competitors yet still reject specific features like cloud keychains, especially for legal/ethical obligations (e.g., handling others’ confidential data).
  • Discussion of nuanced threat models: government, medical, legal contexts vs. ordinary personal use.

Alternatives and Mitigations

  • Suggested password alternatives: Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePassXC, Codebook, password-store; plus local encryption (e.g., GPG, Cryptomator).
  • Some advocate privacy-focused OSes (Qubes OS, Asahi Linux on Apple Silicon) to avoid “call-home” behavior.
  • Detailed hardening strategies: disabling iCloud via MDM/Configurator, blocking Apple IP ranges and CDNs, strict Wi‑Fi/MDM policies, Faraday cages and SDRs for verification, or hardware radio modifications.

Apple QA and Software Quality

  • Numerous anecdotes of persistent bugs across Apple Watch (including Ultra), iOS, iCloud services, and macOS, fueling a sense of declining quality.
  • Some report essentially bug‑free experiences, highlighting strong variability.
  • Comments describe under-valued, monotonous QA work, reliance on contractors, resistance to automated testing, and a de facto “test in production” culture.