Denver gave homeless people $1k/mth. Year later, nearly half had housing
A Denver pilot that gave hundreds of unhoused people monthly cash payments of up to $1,000 reports that roughly 45% were housed after a year, but commenters note that a group receiving just $50 a month saw nearly identical housing outcomes. Critics argue the study lacks a true control group and that many people cycle out of homelessness anyway, making it hard to attribute housing gains or public-cost “savings” to the payments alone. The exchange broadens into whether guaranteed income meaningfully reduces homelessness compared to direct housing and services, and what the findings imply for universal basic income and social policy design.
Study design and control-group debate
- Major contention over methodology: no group received $0, so many argue there is no true control group.
- Others treat the $50/month group as a de facto control or “placebo,” but this is disputed because $50 is still a real intervention, especially for homeless people.
- Participants were recruited via service agencies, so the sample skews toward people already seeking help, not the full homeless population.
- Some commenters see the study as preliminary and underpowered for firm conclusions; others criticize it as designed to produce positive headlines.
Housing and employment outcomes
- All three groups showed large increases in being housed (roughly mid-40% housed after a year), with minimal differences between $50, $1,000, and lump‑sum+$500 groups.
- A key nuance: the $50 group started with more people already housed, so their improvement (delta) may be smaller.
- Employment effects were more differentiated: $1,000/month saw sizable employment gains; the $50 group reportedly showed no change or even a drop in full‑time work.
Interpretation and base rates
- Several note that most homelessness is transient; many would exit within a year anyway, so you must ask “compared to what?”.
- Because there’s no $0 group, it’s unclear how much of the improvement is due to cash vs natural churn or other supports.
- Some see the similar housing rates across payment levels as evidence that more cash (in this range) barely improves housing attainment.
Costs, public services, and ROI
- Reported “public service savings” are questioned; cost declines might simply reflect people exiting homelessness over time.
- One reading of the appendix suggests total public service costs may have increased modestly, though interpretation is unclear.
- Others argue even expensive programs may be preferable to current spending on policing, incarceration, and emergency services.
What actually helps: cash vs housing vs services
- Several claim unaffordable housing is the main driver; therefore “just give housing” is argued as the straightforward fix.
- Others counter that for chronically homeless people with severe addiction or mental illness, housing alone often fails; problems like property destruction, crime, and drug use in projects are cited.
- Some advocate institutional care for the most impaired, but acknowledge it’s politically difficult.
- A recurring theme: attention, trust, and ongoing support (Hawthorne‑like effects) may matter as much as the cash itself.
Implications for UBI and policy
- Thread is divided: some see evidence that even small, unconditional cash can improve well‑being and employment.
- Others note that if outcomes are similar from $50 to $1,000, then “just give more money” is not the magic lever for housing.
- Several distinguish targeted pilots from true universal basic income, emphasizing that UBI would avoid means‑testing but might change prices and incentives.
- A few suggest focusing more on preventing homelessness (upstream) rather than trying to reverse it once entrenched.
Moral and societal views
- Some insist any aid is worthwhile and humane; others argue that if success rates are far below 100% or 90%, programs are failing or easily gamed.
- There is pessimism about ever fully eliminating homelessness, but also discomfort with current inhumane conditions.