Zed Editor automatically downloads binaries and NPM packages without consent

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

A new controversy around the Zed code editor centers on its practice of automatically downloading and running language servers and other binaries—sometimes from third parties—without explicit user consent. Commenters weigh convenience and a smooth “it just works” experience against security, privacy, and corporate policy concerns, pointing to risks like supply-chain attacks, untrusted npm scripts, and lack of network sandboxing. Zed’s team acknowledges the issue and says they plan to add consent mechanisms and shift more functionality into user-installed extensions, but some argue that shipping insecure defaults, even in a pre‑1.0 product, is unacceptable.

Automatic Downloads vs. User Consent

  • Many see silent downloads and execution of binaries/LSPs (language servers) as a serious violation of user trust, especially for untrusted code.
  • Others argue prompts for each tool would be unbearable and prefer a smooth, “it just works” experience.
  • Several suggest middle-ground options: one-time global choice (“yes/no and remember”), per-workspace trust, install-time setting, or compile-time configuration for distro builds.

Security, Supply Chain, and Trust Boundaries

  • Key concern: opening a project with malicious npm packages or language tools could execute arbitrary code without the user realizing.
  • Comparisons are drawn to supply‑chain attacks (e.g., xz) and the lack of guarantees that GitHub releases match source.
  • Some argue that everyone already draws a trust line (OS packages, Vim plugins, VS Code extensions), while others insist defaults must be “offline by default” or tightly controlled.
  • Corporate and high‑sensitivity environments especially object to unvetted network access and automatic installs.

Comparisons to VS Code and Other Editors

  • VS Code is criticized for popup “spam,” telemetry, and network‑unrestricted extensions, but also praised for explicit consent prompts and workspace trust.
  • Some like that Zed previously had strong built‑in language support without extra setup; others already disable LSPs entirely or rely on AI autocomplete.
  • Several users cite alternatives: Vim/Neovim (with Mason/ALE), JetBrains IDEs, Sublime, Kate, and distro‑managed tools.

Zed Team’s Explanation and Future Plans

  • A Zed co‑founder explains current language support: built‑in, pre-bundled extensions, and user-installable extensions.
  • States that auto-downloads are currently vetted and sourced from known projects, but agrees consent is needed and plans to:
    • Add prompts before installing executables.
    • Eventually move all language support to installable extensions for user choice.
  • Some appreciate the transparency and pace of development; others respond that “small team / pre-1.0 / free” does not justify weakening security or privacy.