Three years in North Korea as a foreigner (2021)

Life as a Western diplomat in early-2000s North Korea emerges as both oddly comfortable and deeply isolating: embassy staff had pools, tennis and limited travel freedom, yet no open internet, tightly controlled shops that only took foreign currency, and constant awareness of an oppressive regime and widespread poverty outside the compound. Commenters compare this experience to other authoritarian or dangerous postings, debate the ethics and risks of visiting countries like North Korea or Iran as tourists, and explore how sanctions, internal mismanagement and black-market workarounds shape ordinary North Koreans’ lives. The thread also touches on diplomatic logistics and espionage concerns, from satellite links and foreign-only stores to bugged embassies and the role of bribes and foreign currency in getting anything done.

Reactions to the article and foreign‑service life

  • Many found the piece gripping and “time‑capsule”-like, especially the mix of hardship and perks (pool, tennis, travel).
  • Some were surprised the UK has an embassy in Pyongyang and curious who accepts such postings, how they live, and whether families come.
  • Motivations suggested: career progression, adventure, strong compensation packages, relative physical safety compared to war zones, and unique insight into a secretive state.

Isolation, technology, and communications

  • Commenters highlighted the extreme isolation: no public internet, one propaganda TV channel, and tightly controlled information.
  • The article’s period is inferred as early 2000s, before smartphones; later comments note today’s limited smartphones and a walled‑garden intranet (Kwangmyong).
  • Embassies likely had satellite links for official communication; personal use was either disallowed or very constrained. Exact access levels are unclear.

Daily life, food, and foreigner economy

  • Kimchi/cabbage harvests were compared to Soviet and Uzbek “voluntary” mass labor and to pickled‑cabbage traditions in Eastern Europe.
  • Foreigners shopped in segregated stores, paying in euros; possession of local currency was forbidden. This was linked to Eastern Bloc–style “hard currency” shops.
  • Bribery via whisky and cigarettes was described as routine lubricant in a dysfunctional, semi‑barter economy; such goods circulate as unofficial currency.

Safety, tourism, and ethics

  • Strong disagreement over visiting NK: some list it as a bucket‑list destination (after liberalization); others warn of arbitrary detention and cite the Otto Warmbier case.
  • Comparisons were made to risks in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Singapore (harsh penalties), with most agreeing NK is unusually arbitrary and opaque.
  • Several stress that travelers to sanctioned or hostile states are warned to be extremely cautious.

Embassies, intelligence, and security

  • Discussion suggests embassies mix conventional diplomats with intelligence officers; embassies also serve as pre‑positioned channels for crisis diplomacy.
  • There are anecdotes of heavy bugging of foreign missions (e.g., a compromised SCIF in Pyongyang, concrete‑embedded bugs elsewhere).
  • Some argue SCIF procedures are strong in theory but often undermined by human behavior and host‑country capabilities.

North Korean poverty and sanctions

  • One line of argument: sanctions and embargoes are a major driver of NK’s poverty and should have been emphasized more.
  • Counter‑argument: much of NK’s economic collapse is self‑inflicted through mismanagement, costly prestige projects, and under‑utilization of trade with China; Cuba is cited as even more embargoed yet (comparatively) less famine‑stricken.
  • Consensus: NK’s economy is extremely distorted, with foreign currency acquisition a central regime priority.