Three years in North Korea as a foreigner (2021)

Reactions to the article and foreign‑service life

• Many found the piece gripping and “time‑capsule”-like, especially the mix of hardship and perks (pool, tennis, travel).
• Some were surprised the UK has an embassy in Pyongyang and curious who accepts such postings, how they live, and whether families come.
• Motivations suggested: career progression, adventure, strong compensation packages, relative physical safety compared to war zones, and unique insight into a secretive state.

Isolation, technology, and communications

• Commenters highlighted the extreme isolation: no public internet, one propaganda TV channel, and tightly controlled information.
• The article’s period is inferred as early 2000s, before smartphones; later comments note today’s limited smartphones and a walled‑garden intranet (Kwangmyong).
• Embassies likely had satellite links for official communication; personal use was either disallowed or very constrained. Exact access levels are unclear.

Daily life, food, and foreigner economy

• Kimchi/cabbage harvests were compared to Soviet and Uzbek “voluntary” mass labor and to pickled‑cabbage traditions in Eastern Europe.
• Foreigners shopped in segregated stores, paying in euros; possession of local currency was forbidden. This was linked to Eastern Bloc–style “hard currency” shops.
• Bribery via whisky and cigarettes was described as routine lubricant in a dysfunctional, semi‑barter economy; such goods circulate as unofficial currency.

Safety, tourism, and ethics

• Strong disagreement over visiting NK: some list it as a bucket‑list destination (after liberalization); others warn of arbitrary detention and cite the Otto Warmbier case.
• Comparisons were made to risks in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Singapore (harsh penalties), with most agreeing NK is unusually arbitrary and opaque.
• Several stress that travelers to sanctioned or hostile states are warned to be extremely cautious.

Embassies, intelligence, and security

• Discussion suggests embassies mix conventional diplomats with intelligence officers; embassies also serve as pre‑positioned channels for crisis diplomacy.
• There are anecdotes of heavy bugging of foreign missions (e.g., a compromised SCIF in Pyongyang, concrete‑embedded bugs elsewhere).
• Some argue SCIF procedures are strong in theory but often undermined by human behavior and host‑country capabilities.

North Korean poverty and sanctions

• One line of argument: sanctions and embargoes are a major driver of NK’s poverty and should have been emphasized more.
• Counter‑argument: much of NK’s economic collapse is self‑inflicted through mismanagement, costly prestige projects, and under‑utilization of trade with China; Cuba is cited as even more embargoed yet (comparatively) less famine‑stricken.
• Consensus: NK’s economy is extremely distorted, with foreign currency acquisition a central regime priority.