No one expects young men to do anything and they respond by doing nothing (2022)
Commenters debate why many young men seem disengaged from work, family and society, pointing to deindustrialization, precarious low-status jobs, a broken housing market and shifting cultural norms around marriage and fatherhood. Some argue that economic structures and inequality—older and wealthier cohorts capturing most assets, especially housing—have hollowed out traditional paths to status and stability, while others emphasize the loss of religion, community and clear expectations for male responsibility. A recurring fault line is whether elites promote norms (about family, work and “doing what makes you happy”) that they largely ignore in their own lives, leaving poorer men and women to bear the costs in the form of unstable families and rising social distrust.
Housing affordability and homeownership
- Large subthread debates whether “most people can afford a home.”
- Some cite US homeownership rates ~66% and data showing ~30–40% of under‑35s own homes, plus Gen Z matching or slightly exceeding Millennials at the same age.
- Others argue these stats are misleading: homeownership is measured per household, not per adult; many owners are older; rates are declining; and mortgages are larger/longer with higher debt burdens.
- Several note rising housing, education, healthcare, childcare and food costs outpacing wages, calling housing “the” central problem for young people.
- Disagreement on investor impact: some say institutional and small STR investors meaningfully squeeze supply and enable rent‑setting “cartels”; others claim institutional ownership is marginal nationally and the core issue is a 4–5M unit supply shortfall plus zoning/NIMBYism.
- YIMBY vs. SHIMBY (social housing) and rent control debates: more supply seen as necessary; some worry “luxury only” builds and warehousing keep prices high.
Inequality, capital, and corporate incentives
- Many tie young men’s stagnation to deindustrialization, shareholder primacy, and offshoring without retraining.
- Others emphasize globalisation’s consumer benefits but concede housing/education/healthcare have not followed the cheaper‑goods story.
- Some argue elites and asset owners now extract outsized value (housing, land, IP, AI, agribusiness) and externalize costs on labor and the young.
Family structure, gender roles, and norms
- Strong disagreement over causes of family instability:
- One side stresses economic precarity, legal changes (easier divorce), and women’s labor‑force participation making exit from bad relationships viable.
- Another emphasizes cultural loosening of norms around marriage, fatherhood, and “submissive attitude toward the boss,” arguing low‑status men respond rationally to reduced expectations.
- Several note a class split: affluent people quietly maintain stable two‑parent households while publicly endorsing more fluid norms; others say this “elite hypocrisy” thesis is under‑evidenced.
Religion, meaning, and culture
- Some link male drift to loss of religion and shared purpose; others counter that non‑religious people still form stable families.
- Broader concern that societies have over‑monetized life (GDP, shareholder value) and under‑supplied meaning, duty, and civic purpose.
Policy and pragmatic responses
- Proposed levers: more social housing; zoning reform; tying immigration to affordable housing capacity; better retraining; stronger unions; easier voluntary sterilization and contraception to reduce unwanted births.
- There is no consensus on primacy of culture vs. economics, but broad agreement that young men face weak incentives, high housing barriers, and a thin sense of future.