USPS text scammers duped his wife, so he hacked their operation
A story about a security expert who hacked into a massive USPS-themed smishing operation after his wife was targeted prompts a broader look at “hacking back” against scammers. Commenters weigh the ethics and legality of cyber‑vigilantism under laws like the CFAA, contrasting it with the perceived ineffectiveness of law enforcement and cross‑border prosecution. Others focus on root causes, blaming carrier incentives and weak telecom protocols for enabling high‑volume SMS scams, and suggest technical, regulatory, and educational reforms rather than ad‑hoc retaliation.
Legality of “hacking back”
- Many commenters note that retaliatory hacking likely violates the CFAA and similar laws, even when targeting scammers abroad.
- Some want explicit legal carve‑outs or licensing schemes for anti‑scam operations; others strongly oppose exceptions, citing risk of abuse, framing innocents, and selective enforcement.
- Several point out disclaimers (“this isn’t my work / not condoning”) are mostly CYA and may have limited legal value.
Vigilantism vs. formal law enforcement
- Strong emotional support for hitting scammers back; some even fantasize about extreme responses, especially against hospital ransomware.
- Others warn that vigilante justice is dangerous: poor evidence handling, emotional overreaction, risk of targeting innocents, and erosion of rule of law.
- There’s debate over whether society has a “natural right” to justice that justifies vigilantism when the state is ineffective; others counter that this leads toward lynching or anarchy.
Jurisdiction and international limits
- Many stress that scammers operating from China, Russia, or similar jurisdictions are hard to prosecute; extradition is rare and depends on local politics, not just treaties.
- Some argue that if a state won’t or can’t act, practical impunity results even if the act is “illegal on paper.” Others reply legality and enforceability are distinct.
Telecom, SMS infrastructure, and incentives
- Commenters criticize carriers for profiting from scam traffic and having little incentive to stop it beyond regulation.
- Discussion of STIR/SHAKEN and number reputation as partial progress for calls, but SMS/MMS remain a “giant hole”.
- Proposals include:
- Opt‑in for international calls/texts in the US.
- Stronger spam filtering and liability for carriers.
- Even rebuilding messaging with secure, non‑spoofable, end‑to‑end systems.
- Some note that easy reporting (e.g., “report scam” like *69) is missing, but others warn that without resources, more reports just add noise.
Human impact and ethics
- Recognition that scams cause severe emotional and financial harm, sometimes leading to suicide.
- Counterpoint: many call‑center “scammers” are themselves trafficked and coerced, complicating blanket calls to “attack” them.
- Thread raises need for ethics in CS education; others argue ethics courses change little when crime is so easy and lucrative.
Operational and attribution risks
- Several warn about weak OPSEC when going after scammers; retaliation can include serious counter‑attacks or SWATting.
- Misattribution examples (e.g., stale DNS records, compromised third‑party sites) show how easy it is for amateurs to hit the wrong target.