Signal messenger blocked in Russia, says Roskomnadzor

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Overall context: expanding Russian internet controls

  • Commenters see the Signal block as another step in Russia’s broader effort to control online information.
  • Many say the Russian internet is already “close to unusable” for Western content without VPNs; some add that even with VPNs, captchas, throttling, and bans make use difficult.
  • Early blocks like LinkedIn are mentioned as precedent; YouTube is said to be throttled and even fully cut off at times.
  • Domestic video and messaging alternatives exist (e.g., RuTube), but are criticized as lacking large, uncensored content catalogs.

Status of other platforms: Telegram, WhatsApp, YouTube, TikTok

  • Telegram: reported as not blocked and now “vital information infrastructure.” People use it heavily for news, including from all sides of the war.
  • Conflicting claims on WhatsApp: some say it’s “completely blocked,” others say it worked recently and is not blocked; status is unclear.
  • YouTube: reports of long-term throttling, with some saying it was recently “shut off completely.” Proxies (Invidious, LibreTube) are used to access it.
  • TikTok is described as increasingly important for Russian state messaging, fitting a broader realignment away from Western platforms.

Motives: censorship, security, and digital sovereignty

  • Many argue the regime cannot tolerate non-state-controlled media, especially during military setbacks (e.g., in Kursk Oblast).
  • Some see this as preparation for harsher moves, including worries about increased nuclear risk, though this is speculative within the thread.
  • Others frame it as following China’s model: cutting dependence on Western services, growing domestic ecosystems, and enabling tighter surveillance.
  • A reported plan to block Google, Android, and possibly iOS is discussed; skeptics doubt full smartphone disconnection, but others note China’s AOSP-based approach as a model.

Tools and workarounds: VPNs, Tor, protocols

  • VPNs are widely known even among non-technical users; some seek routers with built-in VPNs.
  • Signal’s built-in “censorship circumvention” and community-run proxies are mentioned as partial workarounds.
  • Some distrust Tor and Signal, alleging intelligence-agency control or backdoors; others do not address or endorse these claims.
  • There is criticism of Signal’s centralization and anti-federation stance; XMPP, Matrix, Simplex, Session are proposed as more resilient, decentralized alternatives, with specific XMPP software and onboarding options referenced.

Comparisons to democracies

  • Several note that democratic countries (UK, EU, Australia, Belgium) also contemplate weakening encryption.
  • Signal’s public stance of leaving markets rather than undermining privacy is cited, with some skepticism about how firm such positions would be in practice.