Signal messenger blocked in Russia, says Roskomnadzor
Russia’s move to block the Signal messenger and heavily throttle or disrupt other Western platforms like YouTube is seen as part of a broader effort to tighten control over information and push users toward state-aligned or domestic services. Commenters note that everyday internet use in Russia increasingly requires VPNs, while Telegram remains unusually tolerated, likely due to political or technical considerations. The situation fuels wider debate over centralized vs. federated encrypted messaging, comparisons with Western and Chinese approaches to platform control, and the implications for surveillance, dissent, and potential escalation in the Ukraine conflict.
Overall context: expanding Russian internet controls
- Commenters see the Signal block as another step in Russia’s broader effort to control online information.
- Many say the Russian internet is already “close to unusable” for Western content without VPNs; some add that even with VPNs, captchas, throttling, and bans make use difficult.
- Early blocks like LinkedIn are mentioned as precedent; YouTube is said to be throttled and even fully cut off at times.
- Domestic video and messaging alternatives exist (e.g., RuTube), but are criticized as lacking large, uncensored content catalogs.
Status of other platforms: Telegram, WhatsApp, YouTube, TikTok
- Telegram: reported as not blocked and now “vital information infrastructure.” People use it heavily for news, including from all sides of the war.
- Conflicting claims on WhatsApp: some say it’s “completely blocked,” others say it worked recently and is not blocked; status is unclear.
- YouTube: reports of long-term throttling, with some saying it was recently “shut off completely.” Proxies (Invidious, LibreTube) are used to access it.
- TikTok is described as increasingly important for Russian state messaging, fitting a broader realignment away from Western platforms.
Motives: censorship, security, and digital sovereignty
- Many argue the regime cannot tolerate non-state-controlled media, especially during military setbacks (e.g., in Kursk Oblast).
- Some see this as preparation for harsher moves, including worries about increased nuclear risk, though this is speculative within the thread.
- Others frame it as following China’s model: cutting dependence on Western services, growing domestic ecosystems, and enabling tighter surveillance.
- A reported plan to block Google, Android, and possibly iOS is discussed; skeptics doubt full smartphone disconnection, but others note China’s AOSP-based approach as a model.
Tools and workarounds: VPNs, Tor, protocols
- VPNs are widely known even among non-technical users; some seek routers with built-in VPNs.
- Signal’s built-in “censorship circumvention” and community-run proxies are mentioned as partial workarounds.
- Some distrust Tor and Signal, alleging intelligence-agency control or backdoors; others do not address or endorse these claims.
- There is criticism of Signal’s centralization and anti-federation stance; XMPP, Matrix, Simplex, Session are proposed as more resilient, decentralized alternatives, with specific XMPP software and onboarding options referenced.
Comparisons to democracies
- Several note that democratic countries (UK, EU, Australia, Belgium) also contemplate weakening encryption.
- Signal’s public stance of leaving markets rather than undermining privacy is cited, with some skepticism about how firm such positions would be in practice.