Don't squander public trust on bullshit
Governments and law enforcement are increasingly criticized for misusing emergency alert systems — blasting loud, intrusive messages about Amber Alerts, “Blue Alerts,” custody disputes, or local incidents to entire states in the middle of the night. Commenters argue this erodes public trust, creates “alert fatigue,” and pushes people to disable notifications that might one day warn of genuinely life-threatening events like tornadoes, chemical spills, or missile attacks. Many call for tighter criteria, better geofencing, configurable severity levels, and less propagandistic use to preserve these systems for true emergencies.
Perceived misuse of alert systems
- Many see statewide “blue alerts” (injured officer) and Amber Alerts as misuse of a scarce, high-salience channel that should be reserved for immediate, life-threatening dangers to nearby people.
- Complaints focus on irrelevant geography (e.g., alerts hundreds of miles away), non-urgent content (custody disputes, missing elderly far away), and night-time alerts that wake entire regions.
- Some argue that even intra-family abductions can be traumatic and serious; others say this still doesn’t justify hijacking an emergency broadcast channel.
Consequences: alert fatigue and trust erosion
- Repeated low-value alerts lead many to disable all alerts entirely, even in tornado- or hurricane-prone areas, undermining genuine emergency response.
- Users describe strong annoyance, sleep disruption, and fear (thinking it’s war, nukes, or earthquakes) only to learn it’s minor or irrelevant.
- Several point out this is exactly how to squander public trust and create “cry wolf” conditions.
Design, policy, and liability issues
- Some participants think overuse is driven by liability/CYA: if something goes wrong, agencies want to show they “did everything.”
- Others blame underinvestment, lack of clear written criteria, and absence of accountability or feedback loops.
- Technical notes:
- US system uses cell broadcast with severity levels (including non-disableable “presidential alerts”).
- Some jurisdictions misuse top-level codes (e.g., for Amber Alerts), effectively forcing everyone to receive them.
- Geofencing by tower or region exists but is often underused; some states (e.g., Texas, Illinois, Ontario) reportedly send alerts statewide.
UX and opt-out problems
- Alert UX is widely criticized: extremely loud, hard to silence without dismissing content, hidden logs, and coarse-grained on/off controls.
- People want finer controls: by type (weather vs. crime vs. child abduction), severity, and quiet hours.
International experiences
- Reports from Europe, Asia, Canada, and Australia vary:
- Some countries use tightly localized, infrequent alerts and annual or monthly siren tests that remain trusted.
- Others are already seeing overuse (e.g., frequent non-urgent alerts in Korea, bear SMS alerts in Romania, a controversial missile alert in Taiwan).
Broader themes
- Thread connects this to Goodhart’s law / tragedy-of-the-commons: any effective channel (alerts, email, SMS, reviews) gets spammed until it loses value.
- Parallel distrust extends to media, politicians, and even COVID policies and vaccines, with sharp disagreement over effectiveness vs. overreach and liability waivers.