We outsmarted CSGO cheaters with IdentityLogger
Hidden device fingerprinting in Counter-Strike: Global Offensive servers, using Steam’s now-removed VGUI browser and persistent cookies, is presented as a clever way to identify and re-ban cheaters who evade detection by rotating Steam accounts and IP addresses. Commenters debate the ethics and legality of such tracking under EU privacy rules, and note technical weaknesses like shared IPs, CGNAT and the ease with which sophisticated cheaters can adapt. More broadly, the thread explores how anti-cheat has become an expensive, perpetual arms race involving behavioral analytics, hardware attacks, AI-based cheats and social tactics like shadowbanning or herding cheaters into separate matchmaking pools.
Overall reaction to IdentityLogger approach
- Many find the hidden fingerprinting both impressive and “disgusting.”
- Some argue it’s acceptable in the context of cheaters who deliberately ruin others’ experiences.
- Others worry this shows how easy it is to repurpose browser‑style tracking for games.
- A few suggest platform‑level support (e.g., Steam exposing stronger fingerprint APIs), but note this would quickly become part of the cheat arms race.
VGUI browser, security, and implementation details
- Several comments highlight how insecure the old VGUI browser was: shared cookies across Steam accounts, session theft, and even RCE‑like exploits via server‑served JavaScript.
- Valve eventually removed it, breaking tools like IdentityLogger and in‑game music players but closing a major attack vector.
- Some point out that HTTPS traffic isn’t a real barrier for determined attackers, but is enough to hide from most “script kiddies.”
Privacy, legality, and GDPR/ePrivacy debates
- Some see the hidden cookie as a clear tracking mechanism that would violate EU rules today.
- Others argue fraud/cheat prevention could be a “legitimate interest” / “user‑centric security cookie” not requiring explicit consent, though disclosure would still be expected.
- There is disagreement over whether “long‑lived” (10+ years) cookies can ever count as “limited duration.”
Effectiveness, limits, and the arms race
- Consensus: technique is useful mainly to raise the cost of ban evasion and push cheaters elsewhere, not to “solve” cheating.
- Critics note it’s trivial for technically skilled cheaters to defeat once known (e.g., delete a file, reinstall, or sandbox).
- Discussion emphasizes the broader cat‑and‑mouse: kernel‑level cheats, DMA devices, AI/YOLO‑based aimbots, external overlays, and server‑side statistical detection.
- Some argue modern anti‑cheat is fundamentally defeatable; focus should shift to plausibility modeling, reputation systems, and human review rather than absolute prevention.
IP bans and collateral damage
- Heavy debate on IP‑based banning:
- Pro: cheap, easy, effective against low‑effort cheaters; widely used in practice.
- Con: CGNAT, dynamic IPs, and shared networks mean frequent collateral bans and possible denial‑of‑service against innocents.
- Suggested mitigations: combine IP with other identifiers, expire bans, use whitelists or cheater‑only “hell” queues, and accept some unfairness on small private servers.