Hacking 700M Electronic Arts accounts

A security researcher found a chain of vulnerabilities that allowed full takeover of roughly 700 million Electronic Arts accounts, including the ability to unban users, change linked console identities, and hijack usernames, all without triggering two-factor authentication. Commenters criticize EA’s slow remediation, lack of a bug bounty, and opaque banning policies, noting that such issues incentivize exploit sales or quiet abuse rather than responsible disclosure. The thread also explores how large, fragmented systems create these flaws, the legal and ethical risks for researchers, and the broader tension between corporate security practices and user trust.

Vulnerability impact & exploitation ideas

  • Many see the vuln as catastrophic: potential takeover of hundreds of millions of accounts, reversal of bans, stealing usernames, or mass banning.
  • Speculation on monetizing it: “unban APIs,” subscription “pay to stay unbanned,” paid username stealing, or selling bans as a service.
  • Some note that loud attacks (mass bans) would trigger investigation quickly; quieter abuse (e.g., account renames, targeted bans) could be more profitable and harder to detect.
  • Others fantasize about “teaching EA a lesson” via chaos, while several push back that this mainly harms players, not just the company.

Bug bounties and incentives

  • Strong criticism that EA paid nothing for a severe, well-documented finding.
  • Some say lack of bounty plus legal risk encourages researchers to hoard vulns or sell them on the grey market.
  • Others suggest bureaucracy and procurement rules make ad‑hoc payments hard, even when security teams want to reward.
  • A few argue a company might reasonably choose responsible disclosure without paying for unsolicited reports, questioning where “negligence” begins.

Legal and ethical considerations

  • Multiple comments warn that exploiting such bugs risks serious prosecution (CFAA, FBI, extradition).
  • Discussion of operational security tactics (VPNs, Tor, VPS chains) is met with caution: one mistake can be enough to get caught.
  • Debate on whether using the vuln to unban one’s own unfairly banned account would still be illegal; consensus leans toward “yes.”

Technical discussion

  • Noted that game binaries with hardcoded privileged credentials are inherently unsafe; if the client can read it, an attacker can too.
  • Suggestions around string extraction, reverse engineering, MITM, and obfuscation; obfuscation is seen as only a speed bump.
  • Emphasis that clients should be treated as untrusted; servers should rely on user accounts rather than trusted client secrets.

EA engineering, operations, and support

  • Former/adjacent engineers describe internal account systems (e.g., Nucleus, Blaze) as originally internal and locked down, later apparently proxied or exposed.
  • Some lament EA’s reliability and opaque, often harsh banning process.
  • There’s frustration over EA claiming some account-linking changes are “technically impossible,” while this vuln demonstrates such links are in fact mutable, though broader side effects remain unclear.