YubiKey still selling old stock with vulnerable firmware

Hacker News Discussion ↗

Yubico is under fire for continuing to sell YubiKeys with a known, unpatchable side‑channel vulnerability in their Infineon-based firmware, including FIPS-certified models, while reserving updated hardware for “prioritized” customers. Commenters debate how serious the flaw is—since it requires physical access, specialized equipment, and often additional credentials—versus what they see as a breach of trust by a company whose core promise is non-extractable secrets. The thread also raises broader questions about vendor responsibility for recalls, the limits of FIPS and other certifications, and whether more open or flashable alternatives like Nitrokey or JavaCard-based tokens offer a better long-term security model.

Continuing sale of vulnerable YubiKeys

  • A translated blog comment alleges Yubico is selling off existing stock with vulnerable firmware, especially the FIPS series, while reserving fixed firmware for “prioritized” customers.
  • Several commenters verify that the YubiKey 5 FIPS product page explicitly lists firmware 5.4.x (known to be vulnerable) and does not flag this as such.
  • Others note that non‑FIPS keys in the store are clearly labeled with newer 5.7.x firmware.
  • Some see this as “dumping” vulnerable stock on unsuspecting customers; others argue the claim that Yubico mis‑ships older firmware when advertising new is unproven or anecdotal.

FIPS certification and constraints

  • FIPS 140-2 validation currently only covers the vulnerable 5.4.2 / 5.4.3 firmware.
  • Newer, fixed firmware (5.7.x) is not yet FIPS‑validated; Yubico has only just submitted for FIPS 140-3.
  • This leads to the odd situation where “FIPS-certified” keys are less secure in practice, but required for regulatory compliance.

Vulnerability impact and threat models

  • Vulnerability is a side-channel in Infineon’s ECDSA implementation enabling private key recovery for ECC keys (FIDO2 and other ECC smart card uses); RSA keys are reported as unaffected.
  • Exploit requires physical possession, specialized equipment, many successful auth/sign operations, and likely disassembly; some describe keys as effectively tamper‑evident, others counter that shells can be replaced.
  • Many consider this relevant primarily for nation-states or highly motivated attackers; for most users it remains a theoretical risk and still strong protection against phishing.
  • Others argue that hardware tokens are sold precisely on “inextractable keys,” so any feasible extraction undermines their core value.

Replacement, trust, and customer expectations

  • Yubico’s advisory offers mitigations but no free replacement; this contrasts with an earlier advisory where affected keys were replaced.
  • Some view refusal to replace or discount as a serious trust breach, especially for environments that must retire any known‑vulnerable systems.
  • Others argue lifetime replacement of all past keys is unrealistic at the price point; they still trust Yubico and see flaws as inevitable in complex security products.

Alternatives and openness

  • Alternatives mentioned include Nitrokey, JavaCard-based tokens, and token2 devices with open firmware.
  • Openness is seen as a plus (inspectable firmware, independent review), but there are reports of Nitrokey shipping late, missing promised features, and having weaker support.
  • Flashable firmware is debated: better for updates, but potentially more exposed if the host system is compromised.