Biden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia with Long-Range U.S. Missiles
Biden’s decision to let Ukraine use long-range U.S. ATACMS missiles against targets inside Russia has triggered debate over whether this shift can meaningfully change the course of the war or is simply “too little, too late.” Commenters weigh the military upside—disrupting Russian logistics, shoring up Ukrainian defenses, and improving Kyiv’s bargaining position—against fears of nuclear escalation and broader destabilization of the post‑1945 security order. Others argue that yielding to Russian “red line” threats would be more dangerous in the long run, emboldening further aggression in Eastern Europe and undermining international norms against territorial conquest.
Immediate military impact and short window
- Several comments frame the new ATACMS permission as late and possibly temporary, with some assuming a ~2‑month window before potential reversal.
- Debate over what Ukraine can realistically achieve in that time: some expect only limited territorial gains due to manpower and resource constraints; others see value mainly in degrading Russian logistics and infrastructure.
Territorial control and Kursk operation
- Users note Ukraine’s small incursion into Russia’s Kursk region; estimates in the thread mention ~2% of the region taken and later partly lost.
- Some argue holding Russian territory might be Ukraine’s only leverage to regain its own land, given assumptions that Russia will not voluntarily cede any territory.
- Others highlight Ukrainian daily losses and question whether exhausted, forcibly conscripted soldiers can sustain offensive gains.
Endgame, land-for-peace, and security guarantees
- One recurring idea: Ukraine may ultimately accept leaving some occupied areas under Russian control in exchange for robust security guarantees (NATO membership or NATO‑like defense pacts).
- There is skepticism that Russia would ever “swap” large occupied areas for small Ukrainian gains in Russia.
Nuclear escalation and “red lines”
- Thread is split on nuclear risk: some fear escalation and see long‑range strikes as dangerous; others argue Russia’s many “red line” threats have repeatedly been bluffs.
- Views range from “better to fight Russia now” to warnings that nuclear war should not be lightly risked and that some comments reflect dangerously casual attitudes.
- Some suggest Russia’s leadership and elites are constrained from nuclear use by self‑preservation; others worry “we can only be wrong once.”
Refugees, genocide, and propaganda disputes
- Heated disagreement over whether Russia hosts the largest Ukrainian refugee population; one user cites a statistics site listing Russia first, others contest earlier contrary claims.
- One side invokes Russian‑hosted refugees to question accusations of “genocidal” intent; opponents counter that refugees from an invasion don’t negate atrocities.
- Accusations of propaganda, “bots,” and astroturfing appear, as well as reminders of forum guidelines.
US, NATO, and global order
- Some argue supporting Ukraine is essential to deter further Russian expansion in Eastern Europe and to preserve the post‑1945 international order.
- Critics describe “Pax Americana” as benefiting the West at the cost of hundreds of millions elsewhere, questioning the moral framing.
- Several see the timing of the decision as linked to impending US political change and expectations of a more pro‑Russia administration.
Adequacy and timing of ATACMS decision
- Some users call the move “long overdue,” but others judge it “too little, too late” compared to Russian aid from North Korea (troops and shells).
- There is concern that lifting restrictions only after Russia dispersed its air force and adapted logistics reduces the weapons’ impact.
- Overall, expectations are modest: ATACMS may help in Kursk and disrupt logistics, but is not seen as war‑decisive on its own.