Yi Peng 3 crossed both cables C-Lion 1 and BSC at times matching when they broke

Incident and basic facts

• Thread clarifies that the linked post is about undersea fiber cables (C‑Lion 1, BSC) in the Baltic failing at times matching track data of the bulk carrier Yi Peng 3.
• The ship is Chinese‑flagged, ~225m bulk carrier, reportedly carrying cargo from Russian ports (e.g., Ust‑Luga) toward Port Said.
• It later stopped in the Kattegat and was shadowed by multiple Danish navy vessels; a pilot boat visited it at least twice. Reports of boarding remain unconfirmed or from low‑trust sources.
• Danish authorities publicly acknowledge their presence but give few details, citing legal/sovereignty constraints on boarding a foreign‑flagged ship.

Evidence, intent, and alternatives

• AIS data: Yi Peng 3 allegedly slowed or drifted over both cable locations around the break times; nearby ships reportedly did not slow in the same way.
• Some argue this pattern plus the ship’s route strongly implies deliberate anchor dragging; others insist we must inspect the cables before drawing conclusions.
• It is noted that ~hundreds of cable breaks occur yearly worldwide and anchors often are to blame; skeptics caution against over‑interpreting coincidence.
• Question raised: if sabotage, why leave AIS on? Replies: turning it off would itself be highly suspicious and tracking by other means still likely.

Russian, Chinese, or other responsibility

• Several comments point to reports that the ship’s captain is Russian and the vessel was Russian‑owned until recently; analogy to “flag of convenience” suggests Chinese registration doesn’t prove state direction.
• One view: this is essentially a Russian hybrid operation using Chinese‑flagged tonnage to obscure responsibility and test NATO/EU responses.
• Another: it could be a paid crew acting for Russian interests without formal state orders; or simply negligence.
• Debate over China’s role:
  • Some think China gains from a prolonged, draining war and may tolerate or quietly support such actions.
  • Others argue China has little to gain from antagonizing Europe and was likely not involved or even aware; Russia may be trying to drag China in symbolically.

Geopolitical context and “grey zone”

• Many frame this as part of Russian “grey‑zone” or hybrid warfare: sabotage, cable and satellite interference, airspace incursions, disinformation, and assassinations that stay below open‑war thresholds.
• Motivations suggested: retaliation for Nord Stream and Western support to Ukraine, probing European resilience and political unity, making life harder in Europe to influence Ukraine‑war negotiations.
• Some float more conspiratorial alternatives (false flag by Western or Ukrainian actors to justify tougher measures against Russia), but these remain unsubstantiated within the thread.

Broader debates

• Large subthreads debate:
  • Effectiveness and collateral damage of sanctions on Russia vs Europe.
  • Whether the West is doing “too little” (prolonging the war) or already “too much.”
  • Risks of escalation, including nuclear threats, versus dangers of appeasement.
• Multiple commenters stress that frequent, ambiguous sabotage of cables/satellites is likely to continue and that Europe/US need better protection, redundancy, and clear doctrines for response.