A pilot crashed a full passenger jet into the bay, didn't lose his job (2021)
A 1968 incident in which Japan Airlines pilot Kohei Asoh accidentally ditched a DC‑8 in San Francisco Bay yet kept his job—after bluntly telling investigators “I f--ked up”—is used to explore the power of candidly owning mistakes. Commenters contrast aviation’s safety culture, which prioritizes root-cause analysis and learning over blame, with more punitive or litigious fields like U.S. healthcare and corporate environments, where legal and reputational risk often discourage genuine apologies. The conversation broadens into how sincere responsibility-taking, paired with concrete prevention steps, can defuse anger, build trust, and improve systems, as opposed to denial, deflection, or purely performative apologies.
Power of Frank Admission (“Asoh Defense”)
- Central theme: the captain’s blunt “I messed up” is praised as an example of honest accountability that preserved his career and built trust.
- Many argue that genuine, specific ownership (what went wrong, how it’ll be prevented) improves relationships and careers, and disarms anger more than denial or blame-shifting.
- Several note this only works when followed by concrete changes; a hollow “that’s on me” without remediation is criticized.
Apologies, Liability, and Legal Culture
- Healthcare example: some U.S. hospitals report better outcomes (lower lawsuits, better feelings) when they proactively admit mistakes and offer compensation.
- Others highlight U.S. legal incentives against admitting fault (e.g., gross negligence, treble damages) and standard legal advice to “never admit liability.”
- There’s debate over whether the U.S. system is “out of control” on damages; one commenter asks for substantiation, no clear resolution given.
- Concern that apologies can be gamed as strategy rather than genuine remorse.
Aviation Culture: Safety Over Blame
- Aviation is described as having a strong non‑punitive safety culture: focus on root causes, training, and prevention rather than punishment, to encourage reporting.
- Examples: no‑fault go‑around policies; support for pilots who proactively seek help (e.g., for substance issues) vs harsh penalties when they hide risks.
- Some stress that “I messed up” is not sufficient in a modern investigation; root cause, procedures, and training still need analysis.
Training, Systems, and Root Cause Analysis
- Several argue the true root cause of the bay landing was inadequate training on a new instrument system, and criticize management and era norms that allowed pilots to use unfamiliar systems in low‑visibility conditions.
- Discussion of engineering parallels: production database deletions, guardrails like restricted accounts, confirmation scripts, and “pointing and calling” rituals to reduce human error.
- Emphasis that RCA should go beyond “human error” to systemic issues enabling the mistake.
Technical Notes on Water Landings
- Clarifications that airliners are not watertight; they float temporarily and can sink faster if damaged or doors are opened.
- Comparisons to other ditchings (e.g., Hudson River) to illustrate variability in outcomes.
Personal Anecdotes and Limits
- Multiple stories: avoiding tickets, defusing road‑rage, calming angry customers, all via immediate, sincere apologies.
- Some caution that this strategy works best in humane, non‑disposable workplaces; in harsh or purely transactional environments, admission may simply invite punishment.