The paper passport's days are numbered

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Technical foundations & security

  • Many note that e-passports already use PKI and chips; a “digital passport” is mostly moving the same signed blob to phones or cards.
  • Big concern: how to handle CA key compromise without invalidating millions of documents. Ideas:
    • Short-lived intermediate certs with public logs or timestamp services (RFC 3161) to prevent backdating.
    • Revocation with cut‑off dates, OCSP, and registries of “known good” IDs.
  • Others stress the need for offline verification: border devices preloaded with root keys; fallback to visual anti‑forgery checks if systems are down.

Current deployments & pilots

  • Examples cited: Singapore’s largely automated, sometimes passport‑less gates; EU/Schengen e‑gates and upcoming Entry/Exit System; US Mobile Passport Control and CBP ROAM; digital ID ecosystems in places like Denmark, Estonia, and Ukraine.
  • These are mostly add‑ons: physical passports are still required or strongly assumed.

Phones as ID & single point of failure

  • Strong resistance to making smartphones mandatory for travel; issues include battery, breakage, theft, unsupported/custom ROMs, OS “insecurity” flags, and people banned from owning smartphones.
  • Some suggest government‑issued, purpose‑limited devices or keeping IDs on smartcards instead of phones.
  • Others like digital convenience but insist physical documents must remain as fallback.

Privacy, surveillance & control

  • Worries about pervasive facial recognition, linking travel, SIMs, and movement into central dossiers, and “border tech” expanding into everyday life.
  • Concerns that digital credentials (including web standards) will normalize strong ID checks everywhere and increase corporate/government tracking.
  • Some see this as a human‑rights issue: freedom of movement shouldn’t depend on owning a smartphone.

Paper passports, stamps & records

  • Many want to keep physical passports and even entry stamps, both for personal records and as independent proof when databases fail or are wrong.
  • Digital‑only visas and statuses (e.g., UK schemes) are criticized: if a database entry is lost or “computer says no,” people can’t prove rights to live, work, or reenter.

Practical & geopolitical limits

  • Remote borders, poor infrastructure, disasters, and less‑developed crossings are seen as long‑term blockers to going paperless globally.
  • Skepticism that all states would ever share a unified system; sovereignty, politics, and differing ID cultures make full digital replacement unlikely for decades.