Jeju Air Jet Crashes in South Korea With Over 170 Dead or Missing
A Jeju Air Boeing 737-800 crash at South Korea’s Muan International Airport, killing nearly all of the 181 people on board, is prompting intense scrutiny of both pilot actions and airport design. Commenters point to video and early reports suggesting a bird strike, engine problems, and a high-speed belly landing with landing gear and flaps not deployed, raising questions about task saturation in the cockpit, aircraft redundancies, and why the jet overran a 9,200-foot runway into a concrete ILS structure rather than being stopped by a more forgiving overrun system. The tragedy is also being weighed against long-term trends showing commercial flying remains extremely safe, even as rare catastrophic events attract intense global attention.
Apparent sequence of events
- Multiple posts refer to video showing the 737 sliding down the runway with no landing gear and apparently high speed, then striking an embankment / structure and breaking up in a large fireball.
- Reports summarized from Korean media:
- Bird strike on right wing/engine at ~200 m on first approach.
- Go‑around initiated; second approach attempted.
- Engine fire and suspected loss of hydraulics/electrics; smoke/toxic gases entering cabin.
- Emergency belly landing attempted without time for fuel dumping or special runway prep.
- Only two survivors reported so far, both rear cabin crew; many commenters describe survival as astonishing given the footage.
Landing gear, systems, and pilot actions
- Strong debate over whether bird strike could mechanically prevent gear deployment; several point out triple‑redundant hydraulics and gravity‑drop gear on 737NG.
- Others note it is technically possible for crews to land gear‑up despite alarms; several historic examples are cited.
- Discussion of cockpit warnings (“TOO LOW GEAR”, configuration warnings) and how multiple concurrent alerts plus engine issues could cause task saturation and missed cues.
- Some speculate about an attempted late go‑around, high speed, and flaps not being deployed, but this is repeatedly labeled as provisional pending investigation.
Runway end, wall, and EMAS
- Significant criticism of the concrete/earth structure at the runway end; some call the airport design “unbelievably awful”.
- Others argue the berm/antenna support and thin perimeter wall likely worsened the break‑up but wouldn’t be intended as a barrier.
- Discussion of EMAS (engineered arrestor beds): common at some airports, but apparently not installed here; several note EMAS relies on wheels and may be ineffective for gear‑up or very high‑speed overruns.
Water vs runway landing
- Repeated question: why not ditch in nearby water?
- Majority view: runway is always the planned option; water landings are highly risky (break‑up, drowning, delayed rescue).
- Several note pilots may not have fully recognized the landing‑gear/config emergency or had time/altitude to choose water.
Pilot training, culture, and safety context
- Debate over training standards and required flight hours (US vs South Korea), and whether more hours equal better crisis performance.
- Discussion of task saturation, loss of situational awareness, and evolution from three‑crew to two‑crew cockpits.
- Broader context: commercial flying still portrayed as extremely safe; this crash stands out because such events are now rare.