Trusting clients is probably a security flaw
Mobile apps that rely on client-side checks instead of robust server-side validation are being criticized as a basic security failure, with McDonald’s heavily promoted app highlighted as a particularly egregious example. Commenters argue that anti‑root and DRM measures like Google’s Play Integrity mostly serve to shift liability and constrain user control, while doing little to stop determined attackers if the server trusts whatever the client claims. The conversation broadens into concerns about mobile OS permissions, the perverse incentives of outsourced app development, and whether professional standards or unions are needed to resist building insecure, privacy‑hostile systems.
McDonald’s app & trusting the client
- Multiple commenters are surprised this is yet another case of McDonald’s apps lacking proper server-side validation, despite wide publicity.
- Core critique: heavy anti-reverse-engineering and root checks give a false sense of security and encourage developers to “trust the client,” which is fundamentally flawed.
- Some see the impact as mostly McDonald’s losing money and reputation; others worry about precedent and what else the same teams might build.
Root detection, DRM, and device control
- Many criticize Play Integrity / SafetyNet–style checks and root detection: they don’t stop serious attackers but punish power users and reduce device ownership.
- Several banking and corporate apps are cited as refusing to run on rooted phones or even phones with sideloaded apps; other commenters say those same apps run fine for them, suggesting OS/version differences or inconsistent checks.
- Some defend these checks as risk management and tech-support reduction, but others see them mainly as liability-shifting and control.
Android/iOS sandboxing, filesystem, and backup
- Discussion on Android’s changing storage model: older versions allowed broad filesystem access; newer ones sandbox more tightly, improving security but complicating backups.
- Users lament the lack of a robust, system-level, app-data backup interface and see Google nudging people toward its cloud sync.
- iOS is viewed as more locked down but also less leaky in terms of apps inspecting the device.
Developer incentives, outsourcing, and security culture
- Several argue that outsourced/mobile “app mill” work optimizes for shipping quickly and passing checklists, not real security.
- One contractor openly describes doing the bare minimum and waiting to bill fixes later, prompting pushback around ethics and client risk.
- Some note that security “best practices” often function more as liability cover than true protection.
Unions, professionalization, and labor market
- A thread explores unions or professional bodies for developers to refuse insecure or unethical work.
- Others doubt this is realistic: accreditation brings questions about who is blamed in a team and whether members would actually be protected.
- Mixed views on the job market: easy in some EU countries for mid+ roles; difficult for seniors and in the US since recent layoffs.
Other examples & user experiences
- Examples include insecure ticketing/public transport apps, heavily obfuscated IoT apps (e.g., Tuya ecosystem) that fight local control, and anti-cheat in games installing kernel-level components.
- Polish McDonald’s users complain about declining coupon value, clunky kiosks, and being forced into the app for decent prices.
- Some refuse to install such apps at all or leave 1-star reviews when root checks block them.