Advanced Magnet Manufacturing Begins in the United States

Meaning and Mining of “Rare Earths”

• Commenters stress rare earth elements aren’t geologically rare in the US; they’re “rare” because ore deposits are dilute and processing is complex and toxic (including low-level radioactivity).
• The main environmental problem is in chemical processing and separation, not just mining; references to radioactive waste ponds and long-running disputes over waste in places like Malaysia.
• Some clarify that “rare” historically referred to their scarcity in concentrated mineral form and difficulty of isolation, not absolute crust abundance.

US–China Supply Chains and MP Materials

• Thread highlights that China holds a near-monopoly on rare-earth production, both mining and especially refining, and is not a US ally.
• MP Materials’ vertically integrated chain (mine → beneficiation → separation → alloy → magnets) is seen as significant for reducing reliance on Chinese processing, especially after China’s ban on exporting processing tech.
• Past bankruptcies at Mountain Pass are tied to price crashes and Chinese overproduction; several note that rare-earth location is mostly a function of cost and regulation, not physical scarcity.
• Some argue this long supply chain re‑build should have been preserved years ago instead of letting US capacity be offshored.

Alternative Magnet Technologies (Niron, Iron Nitride)

• Niron Magnetics’ iron-nitride approach attracts interest but also strong skepticism.
• Critics note: tiny planned capacity (5 tons/year vs thousands elsewhere), decade-old patents with no visible large-scale product, and fundamental material challenges (unstable crystal phases, low coercivity).
• Some suggest their early patents may be “bogus” or overly broad, potentially delaying others; others see it as a typical high-risk deep-tech effort that may still fail.

Motor Design Without Rare Earths

• Question raised: why not avoid rare-earth magnets entirely via synchronous reluctance or separately excited synchronous motors.
• Responses: non-permanent-magnet motors are cheaper and used where possible, but generally have lower efficiency and torque density, hurting EV range and heat management.
• Rotor electromagnets introduce cooling challenges and slip-ring/inductive-coupling complexity, limiting practicality, though new inductive schemes avoid brushes at some efficiency cost.
• Mention of a growing push toward rare-earth‑free motors and generators that could capture a sizable market share over time.

Industrial Policy, National Security, and Markets

• Many argue key sectors (rare earths, shipbuilding, munitions, PPE) should not be left purely to “cheapest wins” logic due to national security and supply risk.
• Suggested tools: subsidies, tariffs, government stockpiles, and guaranteed offtake, analogous to some agricultural and defense programs.
• Others counter that heavy protectionism (e.g., Jones Act analogies) often backfires, raising costs and weakening industries, and that subsidies must be targeted and limited.
• Debate over whether offshoring was “obviously stupid” or a complex, reasonable decision given lower prices, higher living standards, and expectations that high-value work would remain domestic.
• Several note voters and consumers consistently chose cheaper imported goods, reinforcing corporate offshoring.

Globalization, Strategic Assurances, and Autarky

• Distinction made between full autarky (seen as unrealistic and too costly) and “strategic assurance” – enough domestic or allied capacity to avoid coercion.
• Some regret that earlier focus on pure price delayed development of alternative sources (e.g., in Australia) and eroded microelectronics and manufacturing bases.
• Others argue the US has still benefited enormously from trade, and attempts to freeze low-skill industries domestically could have diverted talent from more valuable tech sectors.

Prices, Subsidies, and “Market Forces”

• Side debate on whether stabilizing prices (e.g., via buying excess production) truly helps low-income households or just raises average prices.
• One camp sees “market forces” as real, emergent human behavior that policy must work with; another calls them artificial constructs shaped by laws and power, not natural like gravity.

Non-US Producers and Capacity

• Mention of non-Chinese producers (e.g., European magnet makers, Australian miners/processors) that still depend heavily on Chinese feedstock or are only now building full chains.
• Multiple exploration-stage REE deposits in the US are noted, but none yet in production beyond Mountain Pass.

Recycling and “American-Made” Magnets

• Some note that “recycling-based” US magnet production can amount to importing finished Chinese magnets, crushing them, and reforming, which still counts as domestic manufacture under some origin rules.
• Parallels drawn with steel recycling as a way to skirt tariffs and origin constraints.

Miscellaneous

• One subthread is a magnet pun exchange; another notes neodymium magnets’ role in elevators, synchrotrons, and toys.
• A few comments criticize the article’s implicit assumption that readers should automatically prefer US over Chinese production, suggesting better trade relations may be another path.