US authorities can see more than ever, with Big Tech as their eyes

Adtech and data inference

• Commenters describe how much can be inferred from seemingly minor data (e.g., city from follow-graphs, gender from tweet text) using old Twitter firehose access.
• A book on adtech is cited to illustrate how “advertising-only” data is quietly resold (especially location) to all kinds of buyers with minimal client vetting.
• Several see too much profit in personal data for collection/sale to ever voluntarily stop.

“Must” collect data vs business-model choice

• Some strongly dispute the article’s claim that Meta, Google, and Apple “must” collect maximal data, arguing they choose to because of ad-driven business models.
• Others say Meta/Google are structurally dependent on data, while Apple is meaningfully different (hardware/services first, some user controls, end‑to‑end encryption options).
• A counterpoint argues all three are still giant corporations systematically collecting and distributing personal data; debating degrees may obscure the core problem.

Individual countermeasures and their limits

• Practical tips discussed: disabling location, turning phones off or using Faraday bags, using fake or “fictional” phone numbers at checkout, hardware kill switches (e.g., privacy-focused phones), paying cash for sensitive purchases, dashcams and home cameras for self‑protection.
• Others argue individual operational security is like farm animals trying to understand a modern farm: the problem is systemic and structural, not solvable by personal hygiene alone.
• The notion of “herd immunity” is raised: even if one person opts out, data from friends, contacts, and shadow profiles can reconstruct much of their behavior.

Surveillance, governance, and risk

• Some claim: if a company knows it, the government effectively does too, via legal requests, adtech purchases, or intelligence agencies—creating a near‑“panopticon” contingent only on political will.
• There’s debate over whether the bigger danger is explicit authoritarians or broadly popular governments quietly normalizing surveillance.
• Others note weak or dysfunctional states may surveil poorly but still punish people using bogus or fabricated “intelligence.”

US vs foreign providers

• One line of discussion emphasizes that foreign providers are not safe either: attacking foreign infrastructure is an explicit intelligence mission, and Five Eyes–style sharing blurs boundaries.
• Another view stresses a practical difference: a US company can be directly compelled through legal process; a well‑secured foreign service must still be technically “broken,” which is non‑trivial with strong cryptography.

Online identity and opting out

• Some advocate treating one’s online persona as a distinct “agent” and simply engaging less: in‑person work, offline hobbies, and fewer apps.
• Others warn that dropout strategies can make individuals stand out; the suggested tactic is to appear normal while selectively “going dark” when stakes are high.