El Salvador's crypto experiment ends in failure

US crypto policy and VC influence

• Commenters link El Salvador’s reversal to a broader US “crypto adventure,” citing an executive order for a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve.
• Several posts allege heavy venture-capital influence (especially one prominent firm) on US crypto deregulation, consumer finance rollback, and key regulatory appointments, tying this to opposition to unrealized-gains taxes, SPAC crackdowns, and stricter crypto rules.

Legal tender vs reserve holdings and regulation

• Some stress the difference between using Bitcoin as legal tender (El Salvador) and holding it as a reserve asset (US proposal), though others argue tax treatment and allowing crypto tax payments would blur that line.
• Crypto in the US is described as mostly under the CFTC (commodities) rather than the SEC (securities), with claims that prior lobbying shifted it there and weakened oversight.

Economic costs, ATMs, and grift concerns

• The article’s figures (≈$375m total program cost vs much smaller realized gains) fuel claims that the policy mainly shifted public funds into private pockets.
• Commenters are incredulous at implied per-ATM costs and debate whether the Moody’s estimate is accurate or if other assets/infrastructure are being overlooked.
• Some see the project as “showboaty” policy by an authoritarian-leaning leader; others doubt both government and critics’ numbers.

Bitcoin as reserve asset and volatility

• Strong disagreement over whether Bitcoin is inherently a “terrible” reserve asset: critics cite extreme, two‑sided volatility and lack of monetary control; defenders compare it to inflation and sanctions risks of fiat reserves.
• There is an extended argument about volatility vs inflation, comparisons to gold and the gold standard, and whether deflation and pegged systems are actually worse.

IMF leverage and geopolitical framing

• One camp sees the IMF as effectively “assassinating” the experiment by conditioning a $1.4bn loan on dropping Bitcoin legal‑tender status, likening IMF programs to mafia-like “structural adjustments.”
• Others argue the article shows the project failing on its own merits (low adoption, high rollout cost, delayed financing), with IMF concerns about volatility framed as reasonable prudence.

Success, failure, and ongoing Bitcoin accumulation

• Many accept that the legal‑tender/payment side of the project failed: limited business acceptance, minimal tax usage, and poor remittance/retail economics.
• Some note the government continues buying Bitcoin as a reserve asset and claim large mark‑to‑market profits, arguing the “crypto experiment” is pivoting rather than over.
• A few point out that even if Bitcoin holdings are profitable, the overall cost–benefit (including delayed IMF deal and weak domestic uptake) still looks negative.

General crypto skepticism and BTC’s long‑term viability

• Multiple ex‑industry voices characterize ~99% of crypto as scams or “greater fool” speculation, arguing that lack of consumer protections and real use cases makes the sector unsustainable.
• There is internal Bitcoin debate over long‑term security: halving-driven reward cuts may underfund mining; proposed fixes (e.g., tail emissions or implicit “security taxes”) would challenge the 21M-cap narrative but might be economically minor.
• Some maintain that even a small Bitcoin allocation in national reserves could outperform bonds over multi‑year horizons, while emphasizing it should remain a minority, high‑risk asset.