Italy demands Google poison DNS under strict Piracy Shield law

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Technical discussion: DNS blocking and workarounds

  • Several comments note that DNS poisoning is usually done at ISP level; switching resolvers can bypass it.
  • DoH is said to help mainly by:
    • Hiding DNS queries inside HTTPS from local MITM censors.
    • Making it easy to use non-default, foreign resolvers (possibly over Tor or proxies).
  • Objection: if the resolver itself (e.g., Google) is compelled to lie, DoH alone doesn’t help; you need an uncooperative foreign resolver.
  • DNSSEC is described as providing authenticity and detectability of tampering, but not guaranteed access to uncensored records.
  • Some argue the only robust path is using resolvers in jurisdictions with no leverage or using VPNs; governments will then push to control browser defaults.

Jurisdiction and enforcement against Google/Cloudflare

  • Debate over how Italy can fine or coerce companies with no staff or hardware in-country.
  • Arguments for leverage:
    • Blocking their IPs nationally, hurting third-party services that rely on them.
    • Targeting domestic customers’ payments or bank accounts.
    • Using EU-wide legal frameworks for cross-border business.
  • Others argue: if a company is willing to abandon the market, practical enforcement becomes hard, similar to ignoring tickets in a foreign country.

Censorship, legality, and what should be blocked

  • One side: any “arbitrary restrictions” on content undermine the internet; corporations should resist.
  • Counterpoint: states must be able to block things like child sexual abuse material and possibly drug markets or destabilizing disinformation; deciding “non-arbitrary” limits should be the job of governments, not US tech firms.
  • Follow-on debate:
    • Some are strongly anti-state-intervention in general (“nanny state” criticism).
    • Others accept targeted blocking but see DNS poisoning as a poor or symbolic tool that doesn’t address root causes.

Sports piracy and copyright economics

  • Sports leagues are seen by some as a major driver of European censorship pressure.
  • One camp: re-broadcasters and users clearly violate the law and often monetize it; courts need “creative” tools when hosts sit in uncooperative jurisdictions.
  • Opposing view: this is driven by greed and broken licensing:
    • “Piracy as a service problem” — multiple subscriptions, regional blocks, rising prices, partial catalogs, and ads push people to pirate IPTV.
    • Streaming platforms are said to optimize revenue right up to the point where users churn, structurally incentivizing bad user experiences.
  • Disagreement over whether people primarily pirate to save money or because the legal UX is so bad.

Europe vs US and democratic responsibility

  • Some criticize “Europe” as regulation-obsessed and hostile to innovation; others stress this is specifically Italian (or specific EU states), not all of Europe.
  • Counter-critique: the US also shapes a non–free internet (DMCA, payment choke-points, TikTok ban debates, Operation Choke Point, FOSTA/SESTA).
  • Discussion whether citizens in democracies bear collective responsibility for such laws, with examples drawn from both EU and US politics.

Decentralizing DNS

  • One thread calls for urgent DNS decentralization, possibly using blockchain (e.g., Namecoin-style) to avoid state choke points.
  • Pushback:
    • DNS already has distributed elements, but the root and TLDs are central and that shared global view is valuable.
    • Fully divergent, user-specific DNS views would harm interoperability.
  • A more moderate suggestion is public, iterable TLD zone publication and users running their own authoritative/root mirrors; censorship would then be bypassed mainly via alternative infrastructures (or VPNs), not a full reinvention of DNS.