Is it safe to travel to the United States with your phone?

Top-Down Policy vs. “Overzealous Guards”

• Many argue there’s no clear evidence of an explicit top-down order; instead, border agents feel politically emboldened (“obeying in advance”) by rhetoric about “tough” enforcement.
• Others think confirmation bias and sensationalist headlines may be exaggerating rare incidents, but concede that if similar cases keep appearing, it signals a pattern.
• Several note that abusive enforcement usually isn’t formally ordered from above; leadership simply looks away, creating a permissive environment.

Free Speech, Non‑Citizens, and “Safety”

• Strong concern that criticism of political leaders is being treated as “potential terrorism,” especially in cases like the French scientist and foreign musicians denied entry.
• Debate over whether constitutional protections (especially the First Amendment) apply to non‑citizens at the border:
  • Some insist the Bill of Rights constrains the government regardless of citizenship.
  • Others cite case law suggesting people seeking initial entry have fewer enforceable rights.
• Disagreement on whether denial of entry is “unsafe”: some say deportation alone isn’t a safety threat; others point to harsh detention conditions and threats of incarceration as making travel unsafe.

Border Search Powers and the 100‑Mile Zone

• Commenters emphasize that US border search issues predate the current administration, and that CBP claims expansive warrantless search authority within 100 miles of borders and coasts, affecting most residents.
• Reports of inland CBP/ICE activity (e.g., along highways, in Michigan) contribute to a sense of creeping interior enforcement, often seen as disproportionately targeting non‑white people.

Phone & Laptop Risk: What People Actually Do

• Consensus: it’s risky to cross any border with a normal, fully loaded device.
• Common strategies:
  • Bring a cheap “burner” smartphone or laptop, factory‑reset, with minimal or staged data and no primary accounts.
  • Delete sensitive apps (social media, messaging, work tools), rely on web access or remote desktop/VPN after entry.
  • Power devices off before landing to increase cryptographic protection (BFU vs AFU).
• Some discuss advanced tactics: multiple encrypted profiles with plausible deniability, hidden volumes, or even NFC implants; others note these can themselves arouse suspicion.

Forensics Capabilities and OS Choices

• Several mention tools like Cellebrite/GrayKey that can often extract data even from locked, encrypted phones, especially if they’ve been unlocked since last boot.
• GrapheneOS is cited as significantly harder to extract from, though only if fully updated and used correctly.
• There’s concern that cloud backups and ubiquitous syncing make device searches less central, since authorities may obtain data directly from providers.

Global Context and Travel Decisions

• Commenters stress that the US is not unique: the UK, France, and others also use terrorism or border laws to compel device access and punish refusal.
• Some now refuse to travel to the US or UK, or work for employers that forbid bringing real work devices, issuing travel burners instead.
• Others argue most tourists are unaware and unaffected, but acknowledge these practices are likely to chill tourism and academic/scientific exchange over time.