Ask HN: Is Washington Post correct in saying Signal is unsecure?
Washington Post’s characterization of Signal as an “unsecure” messaging platform has triggered debate over what “secure” actually means, especially when senior US officials used it to coordinate sensitive military plans. Commenters broadly agree that Signal’s end-to-end encryption is among the strongest available for ordinary users, but argue it falls short of national security requirements that assume compromised phones, strict access controls, and mandatory record-keeping. The core tension is between Signal being highly secure for everyday and journalistic use, yet inappropriate and even illegal as a channel for classified government communications.
What “unsecure” means here
- Many argue “secure” is relative to a threat model: cops vs foreign intelligence vs internal accountability.
- For everyday users, Signal is seen as one of the most secure E2EE messengers.
- For national-security use, “unsecure” is taken to mean “not an NSA‑approved, centrally managed classified comms system,” not “weak crypto.”
Signal’s cryptography vs system‑level security
- Broad agreement that Signal’s protocol and E2EE are strong and well regarded.
- Multiple comments stress that E2EE only secures the channel, not the endpoints (phones, OS, app supply chain).
- Some point out that if apps, OSes, or toolchains are compromised, messages can be exfiltrated in plaintext regardless of encryption.
Unsuitability for classified / organizational use
- Key criticism: Signal lacks features required for classified or corporate environments:
- No enforced vetting/clearance checks before adding participants.
- No centralized identity provider, device management, or policy enforcement.
- Easy to add the wrong person to a group; that’s exactly what happened.
- For “top secret” material, commenters say only SCIFs and air‑gapped classified networks are appropriate.
Device and endpoint vulnerabilities
- Phones are seen as fundamentally exposed: Pegasus‑style zero‑click exploits, theft, shoulder‑surfing.
- Comparison: desktops on isolated networks can be locked down more than consumer smartphones that constantly talk to cell towers.
- Conclusion: for high‑value state targets, assume phones can be fully read if the intel value exceeds the cost of an exploit.
Record‑keeping, law, and ethics
- Several emphasize the bigger issue is evading legal record‑keeping (e.g., disappearing messages, unofficial channels), not Signal’s math.
- Debate over whether deleting/auto‑deleting such chats is itself illegal, especially for senior officials.
- Strong disagreement on the journalist’s role: some see exposing the chat as vital accountability; others call it unethical or even treasonous.
Alternatives, anonymity, and public perception
- Some suggest alternatives like Matrix or SimpleX, though others distrust little‑known projects or ones exposing IPs / requiring phone numbers.
- A few suspect media framing might wrongly damage Signal’s reputation among the general public.