FDIC says banks can engage in crypto activities without prior approval

Regulatory change and enforcement questions

• The FDIC’s “no prior approval” stance is seen as a major loosening; people ask how “manage their risks appropriately” will be enforced in practice.
• Some trust regulators and detailed reporting to police risk; others think oversight will lag, making this effectively self‑regulation.

Crypto risk in banks and how to monitor it

• Several commenters note a pattern of banks with significant crypto exposure blowing up, and want ways to detect exposure early (e.g., FDIC/FFIEC call reports, balance-sheet scrutiny).
• Others argue early adopters in any new sector skew risky, so failures may reflect general risk appetite rather than crypto per se.
• There’s interest in “crypto‑free” labels for banks; others counter that many banks still refuse crypto-related deposits due to AML risk.

Historical lessons: Great Depression, FDIC, central banks

• Long thread on whether unregulated banks vs tariffs caused the Great Depression; some say tariffs were a major contributor, others say nearly all the damage came from banking collapse and monetary contraction.
• Disagreement over whether pre‑Depression banking was “unregulated” and how much regulation actually reduces crises vs just changing their frequency and severity.
• Debate on central banks: one side says independent central banks and FDIC clearly stabilise economies; another calls the central bank an “invisible tax” mechanism via inflation.

Bailouts, deposit insurance, and moral hazard

• One view: regulated banks “don’t blow up” because regulation works; failures are rare relative to total banks and usually resolved via FDIC.
• Counter‑view: banks blow up but are de facto backed by taxpayers; recent guarantees above FDIC limits (e.g., uninsured deposits made whole) are cited as bailouts.
• FDIC and lender‑of‑last‑resort roles are criticized as encouraging risk, since depositors and banks expect rescue.

Crypto’s original ideals vs banking adoption

• Several recall early Bitcoin rhetoric: distrust of central banks, desire for non‑inflationary, peer‑to‑peer money outside banks.
• Now, banks are expected to hold stablecoins and other crypto, which undermines that original anti‑bank ethos.
• Critics say permissioned stablecoins with freeze/reversal features reduce blockchains to inefficient databases when trust already exists.

Fraud, risk, and “casino finance” concerns

• Many see U.S. finance as sliding into more obvious scams; crypto in FDIC‑insured banks is viewed as turbocharging this.
• Others say fraud has always been present; the real question is degree and how much regulation constrains it.
• Some argue money “wants” to become gambling and pump‑and‑dump; without strong rules, finance trends toward casino‑like behavior, and retail savers (“mum and dads”) will be last to know when to exit.

Bitcoin vs other cryptocurrencies

• Distinction drawn between Bitcoin and “crypto”:
  • Bitcoin framed as issuer‑less, proof‑of‑work, immutable, and truly peer‑to‑peer.
  • Most other coins described as centralized, rollback‑prone, or proof‑of‑stake “oligarchies” with CEOs and lobbying budgets.
• Concern that regulators and banks treat all crypto alike, ignoring these structural differences.

Political and lobbying dimensions

• Multiple comments tie the rule change to heavy crypto lobbying and the current political environment.
• A Trump‑branded stablecoin effort is cited as emblematic of regulatory capture and the merging of politics, banking, and speculative crypto products.