A decision to eject from a failing F-35B fighter and the betrayal in its wake

Pilot’s Decision to Eject

• Many commenters think ejecting was reasonable: near-zero visibility, HUD repeatedly failing, multiple fault indications, very low altitude (~750 ft AGL, descending ~800 ft/min), and possible instrument unreliability.
• Others argue he had at least a few seconds to: test pitch/yaw/roll response, verify backup instruments, and try the backup radio before ejecting; they note the jet later flew on for minutes, implying it was still controllable.
• Disagreement over whether a squadron commander (or test-style leader) is expected to “push closer to the redline” and probe the aircraft more than a line pilot, even at higher personal risk.

Risk to Civilians vs Pilot’s Life

• Some are shocked that ejecting over a populated area is considered acceptable when the jet might hit houses; they see a duty to stay with the aircraft as long as possible.
• Others counter that with no reliable vision or instruments, the pilot cannot meaningfully “aim” the jet away from people; staying aboard may only add one more fatality without reducing ground risk.

Investigations, Career Impact, and Possible Scapegoating

• Two early investigations reportedly found most experienced pilots would have ejected; a later command report shifted blame, and he was relieved of command months after being promoted.
• Several see this as classic institutional scapegoating to protect the F‑35 program and discourage criticism, with a chilling effect on future ejection and error reporting.
• Others attribute it to ordinary internal military politics and the harsh norm that commanders can lose careers over incidents “on their watch,” regardless of formal fault.

F‑35 Reliability, Software, and Cost

• Commenters highlight repeated HUD failures and the aircraft’s heavy dependence on complex software and aging avionics hardware; some mock the mismatch between cost and computing power.
• Debate over whether standards like the F‑35 C++ coding rules have meaningfully improved software quality.
• The overall program cost (~trillions over lifecycle) and continuing upgrades feed skepticism that the jet is truly “ready for prime time,” though some note low crash rates and strong export evaluations.

Export Politics, Kill-Switch Fears, and Allied Trust

• Strong thread on how F‑35 exports intertwine with US leverage over allies: maintenance, software updates, and electronic warfare support can be withheld, functioning as a de facto “kill switch.”
• Some insist there’s no evidence of a literal remote shutdown; others argue that cutting updates/ EW support is practically equivalent, and recent behavior toward Ukraine erodes long‑term trust.
• Europeans’ dependence on US fighters vs weaker indigenous options is seen as a strategic vulnerability; a few urge buying or building non‑US systems.

Value of a Pilot vs Value of a Jet

• One camp suggests near-automatic dismissal after ejection (outside clear-cut failures) to ensure pilots don’t “waste” aircraft costing over $100M.
• Opponents emphasize pilot training cost and irreplaceable experience, and warn that punishing ejection will cause hesitation, more crashes, and underreporting—analogous to why rescue services don’t bill evacuees.
• Several note that militaries explicitly trade off human lives against material and strategic goals, whether or not individuals accept that morally.

Military Culture and Broader Morality

• Some see this as another example of a large institution discarding individuals after they’re no longer useful, with parallels to other coverups and blame-shifting (e.g., rail accidents, Chernobyl analogies).
• A moral undercurrent questions sympathy for someone whose career centered on foreign interventions and bombing; others separate that from whether he was treated justly in this episode.

Reactions to the Article Itself

• Multiple readers complain about “long-form filler” (detailed biography, narrative flourishes) and share shortcuts to the technical sections about the malfunction and ejection sequence.
• Others accept it as a human-interest piece rather than a technical investigation and note that it doesn’t resolve key ambiguities, reinforcing the sense that some facts remain unclear or classified.