Why does Britain feel so poor?

Housing, cost of living, and “felt” poverty

• Many commenters see high housing, energy, and transport costs as the central reason Britain feels poor, even if aggregate GDP is high.
• Housing is described as cramped, old, badly located and very hard to expand due to planning constraints and heritage protection.
• Several argue that once rent or mortgages are paid, even seemingly high earners (e.g. £80k in London) are not far ahead of low‑wage workers in social housing.
• Others push back that median incomes and poverty rates haven’t collapsed, suggesting perception is worse than the data indicates.

Planning, infrastructure, and inability to build

• A strong theme is that “we don’t build things”: rail (HS2), energy, housing, even green infrastructure are blocked by labyrinthine consents, local veto points, and over‑protective listing rules.
• Some see this as a vicious circle: high energy/transport costs reduce investment; lack of investment keeps costs high.
• Comparisons are made with countries where large projects are delivered faster and cheaper; others note the US and UK are both especially bad, so it’s not just “common vs civil law”.

Local government, social care, and everyday decay

• Multiple comments highlight councils being legally obliged to fund social care and SEND transport while having little control over demand or prices.
• These “unfunded mandates” squeeze out visible basics: potholes, parks, toilets, libraries, play areas. This daily shabbiness heavily contributes to the feeling of national decline.
• There is concern that much of the social care/SEND spend flows to poorly regulated private providers with high margins and weak outcomes.

Inequality, rentier dynamics, and financialisation

• Many argue Britain is rich but increasingly a rentier economy: wealth gains go to asset owners (housing, land, finance, utilities), while wages stagnate.
• Some link this to decades of financialisation and privatisation, with infrastructure and services turned into profit centres and then periodically bailed out by the state.
• Others counter that blaming “the rich” is too vague; they prefer focusing on concrete policy failures like planning, energy markets, and project procurement.

London vs the rest and post‑imperial drift

• Several note that outside London large areas are now poorer than many US states or EU regions, with especially severe decline in ex‑industrial areas.
• Over‑concentration of jobs, talent and investment in London is seen as self‑reinforcing; some advocate deliberate strengthening of second cities with better transport and devolved powers.
• A different line of discussion frames the malaise as post‑imperial: elites lost a coherent national project after Suez, slid into “managed decline”, and now chase headlines instead of long‑term strategy.

Labour markets, IR35, and class mobility

• One thread blames IR35 and related rules for hollowing out small, worker‑owned service businesses and pushing skilled people back into corporate employment, reducing autonomy and local economic dynamism.
• Others reply that IR35 mostly targeted high‑earning quasi‑employees and is not a core “working‑class” issue, though its implementation is widely seen as chaotic.

Public squalor vs private luxury

• Several describe a sharp contrast between deteriorating public spaces and extraordinarily lavish private homes and office interiors.
• This is interpreted as wealth being “withdrawn from the commons” into private fortresses, reinforcing the sense that the country is poor even while visible elite consumption is booming.

Influencer economics and explanatory narratives

• A recurring side debate centres on popular online economists who attribute the UK’s woes mainly to wealth concentration and debt mechanics.
• Supporters find these narratives intuitive and emotionally resonant; critics call them mathematically sloppy, one‑cause populism that ignores the benefits of investment and asset ownership.