North Korean IT workers have infiltrated the Fortune 500

Anecdotal cases and how they’re detected

• One commenter says their startup accidentally hired a suspected North Korean IT worker for three days, citing red flags in paperwork, strange behavior, and a VPN slip that exposed the real location.
• They believe the goal wasn’t directly scamming their company, but earning money and building a track record.
• Others ask how recruiting will improve (admin access, webcam usage, accents), noting this as a significant process failure.

“Infiltration” vs “just work”

• Some argue these workers are simply doing the job and shipping code; the real issue is sanctions / work-authorization, not security.
• Others strongly disagree, saying almost any North Korean abroad is a state-controlled asset whose work can fund weapons or enable IP theft/backdoors, making this inherently risky.

Hiring, “professional interviewees,” and background checks

• Discussion that these actors can become “professional interviewers”: highly optimized resumes, interview practice, and now AI assistance.
• Some see this as an indictment of tech hiring: companies can’t distinguish polished interviewees from actually strong engineers.
• One detailed example describes North Koreans coaching a US person (“the Bens”), creating fake profiles, passing interviews via remote-desktop prompts, and taking 70% of the salary—specifically to bypass background checks tied to the US identity.

Screening tricks: “Say something negative about Kim Jong Un”

• A startup founder’s heuristic—demanding candidates insult Kim Jong Un—is praised by some as “genius,” but others think it will quickly lose effectiveness.
• Several note North Koreans may be allowed or instructed to perform controlled criticism in foreign interactions, so the test may be fragile.
• There is debate on how effective North Korean propaganda is internally and how much personal cynicism elites might harbor while still never risking visible disloyalty.

Racism, nationalism, and double standards

• A major subthread argues whether blanket suspicion of “North Koreans abroad” is racist, nationalist, or justified security posture.
• Some say treating all North Koreans overseas as state agents is classic scare rhetoric; others insist the regime’s control makes this practically true.
• Comparisons are drawn to other states (China, Israel, Australia, US):
  • One side argues all governments can coerce citizens and pass intrusive laws (e.g., Australian backdoor powers), so risk is not uniquely North Korean.
  • The other side counters that scale, frequency, and dependence on such operations are vastly higher for North Korea, making the comparison misleading.

Remote work, AI fakery, and erosion of trust

• A small startup reports nearly hiring someone using an AI-generated “Polish” video persona; they now require at least one in-person interview.
• Commenters lament that such incidents undermine trust in remote hiring and encourage more invasive verification.

Media, evidence, and propaganda narratives

• Some participants accuse Western media and intelligence agencies of low evidentiary standards and fearmongering about North Korea, noting the asymmetry in how nuclear programs are covered.
• Others push back, arguing that while Western propaganda exists, dismissing consistent reports (including court cases and UN references mentioned in the article) is itself a form of denial or contrarianism.