How to speed up US passenger rail, without bullet trains

California vs. Private High-Speed Projects

• California HSR is framed as a growth/airport-and-freeway-avoidance project, not incremental improvement for existing riders.
• Route choice (Central Valley vs. following I‑5) is heavily criticized; some argue bypassing cities would have been faster/cheaper, others note the ballot measure explicitly required serving places like Fresno.
• Many express deep skepticism that CAHSR will deliver usable segments soon, contrasting it with China’s rapid HSR buildout.
• Brightline (Florida and LA–Vegas) is seen as a promising private model: using interstate medians to simplify approvals and avoid some environmental review, but concerns remain about schedule priority on freight-owned approaches and eventual ticket pricing.

Trains vs. Planes vs. Cars

• Multiple comparisons (e.g., NYC–Chicago, NY–Miami) show Amtrak is often slower and not cheaper than flights; sleeper/first-class train fares can be far higher than airfare.
• Pro-rail voices emphasize comfort, scenery, ability to move around, and lower perceived stress vs. air or long car trips.
• Critics highlight total travel time, need for cars at destinations, and business travel’s need for speed; many see trains as leisure rather than serious business infrastructure outside dense corridors.

Where High-Speed Rail Makes Sense

• Debate over whether US geography and low population density between major cities undermine HSR economics outside the Northeast Corridor (NEC).
• Counterarguments: nonstop city-pair trains don’t require dense intermediate cities; infrastructure can spur development around stations.
• Comparisons with China and Japan note their dense corridors and easier land acquisition, but others argue US once had extensive and effective passenger rail, so geography is not the root cause.

Incremental Improvements vs. “Just Build Bullet Trains”

• Some favor “make existing lines car-competitive first” (e.g., shaving an hour off slow intercity routes) to build ridership, then upgrade to HSR later.
• Others find 2050-style timelines demoralizing and point to 5–10‑year HSR buildouts abroad, seeing the US/Australia pace as symptomatic of systemic dysfunction.

Freight Dominance and Network Shrinkage

• A major constraint is freight railroads owning most track and effectively prioritizing long freights over passenger trains; long trains and short sidings force passenger trains to wait.
• Commenters point to massive abandoned rail mileage and a freight-industry focus on minimizing track (“capital ratio”) as key reasons for thin, fragile networks.

Commuter Rail, Electrification, and Operations

• Several US commuter systems that own or control their tracks perform relatively better than long-distance Amtrak, though reliability and frequency still vary widely.
• Electrification (via overhead lines or third rail) offers better acceleration than diesel-electric, but some note the real-world time savings on mixed-traffic lines are modest.
• Suggestions include Swiss-style regular-interval timetables, higher frequencies, and better boarding operations; others propose car-on-train models or making slower trips more enjoyable rather than purely faster.

Culture, Politics, and “Inability to Build”

• Many tie US rail underperformance to car-centric policy, postwar and earlier “exceptionalism,” racialized backlash against mass transit, and financialization that favors owning assets over building infrastructure.
• There’s broad frustration that the US, despite its wealth, struggles to deliver large rail projects on time and budget, especially compared to earlier eras of ambitious civil works.