Waiting 100 years for a home isn't a housing crisis, it's a moral collapse

Housing as a core test of government performance

• Several commenters treat low-cost, secure housing as a primary metric of state effectiveness, alongside life expectancy, literacy, starvation, maternal/infant mortality, and even fertility rates.
• Idea: a permanent public body that continuously builds simple, durable apartments in economic centres, as a baseline “floor” under the market.

Models of state-led and social housing

• Historical example: Khrushchev-era Soviet blocks—ugly and low quality, but vastly better than pre‑existing slums and crucial for avoiding mass homelessness. Seen both as a success and a warning that “temporary” fixes become permanent if maintenance and economic growth fail.
• Modern examples praised: Singapore’s HDB and Vienna/Austria’s social housing. Tight rules (owner-occupancy, long minimum stays, pricing policy) are seen as key.
• UK and some communist-era European blocks show the downside: under-maintained estates becoming “ghettos,” post‑Grenfell insurance and safety regimes driving huge service charges.

Why we “don’t build fast enough”

• One camp: the core problem is planning and regulation (e.g. UK green belt, discretionary local vetoes, complex and slow approvals, inclusionary zoning acting like a tax).
• Another camp: the “shortage” is overstated; past crashes show prices are highly credit-driven, and when credit tightens the claimed shortage temporarily vanishes.
• Land banking by developers and long‑empty plots in cities are cited as evidence that constrained supply is often deliberate.

Financialisation and empty stock

• Housing increasingly treated as a leveraged asset and pension vehicle; falling interest rates enabled multi‑property accumulation and removal of homes from permanent rental stock.
• Calls to measure and tax second homes, short‑term rentals, and vacant units more aggressively; some cities (e.g. Paris) already doing this with rent caps and vacant-property taxes.
• Land value tax is proposed as a gradual way to deflate bubbles and encourage efficient land use.

Immigration, demographics, and demand (contested)

• One view: high immigration is a key driver of demand and prices; without it, countries with aging populations would see falling prices (Japan cited).
• Counterpoints: some places saw prices rise despite net out‑migration; Gulf states manage large migrant populations with housing; Japan’s falling prices also linked to permissive zoning and weak growth.
• Broader worry: aging societies and low fertility threaten pension systems and intensify reliance on housing wealth.

Homeownership, pensions, and generational tension

• Many owners (especially in the UK) feel trapped: huge mortgages, short fixed-rate periods, and retirement plans tied to selling an expensive urban home and moving somewhere cheaper.
• This creates a powerful bloc opposed to policies that would significantly lower prices, even if those policies help renters.
• Some argue intergenerational conflict is real—older cohorts used housing inflation as a “magic” savings vehicle; younger cohorts face precarity and are effectively forced to speculate just to get shelter. Others push back against framing it as “young vs old.”

Density, urban form, and remote work

• Remote work was seen as a missed chance to deconcentrate opportunity away from a few mega‑cities.
• Debate over density: economically and environmentally beneficial vs. mental‑health harms when taken to East Asian extremes.
• Examples of medium‑rise districts (Portugal, transit‑oriented UK areas) show how 6–10 storey blocks can provide good living standards and local amenities without super‑towers.

Decommodification vs. market‑aligned reforms

• One thread argues the core problem is commodification: as long as homes are investment assets, owners rationally resist abundance. Proposal: “decommodify” housing as much as possible.
• Others focus on YIMBY/incremental approaches: allow by‑right upzoning so every plot can grow modestly (duplexes, extra floors), spreading both gains and disruption.
• There is cautious interest in state‑built basic units, stronger investor incentives for affordable construction, and learning from Chinese “ghost cities” that eventually fill—but also skepticism about overbuilding, local Ponzi dynamics, and quality.