The Icelandic Voting System (2024)

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Complexity, Education, and Understanding

  • Some commenters reacted to the article’s math/axioms as making voting inaccessible, others clarified that Iceland’s actual seat-allocation rule is simple and the Greek-letter axioms describe general criteria, not what voters must learn.
  • Several argued voters don’t need to understand the formulas, only to trust professional administrators—similar to other PR systems or even FPTP.
  • One concern: systems so complex that “most university graduates” can’t follow them may undermine trust.

Proportional Representation vs FPTP and System Comparisons

  • Proportional representation (PR) is defended as more democratic and less prone to massive injustices than FPTP, despite “Dutch weirdness” critiques that some see as cherry‑picked anecdotes.
  • Others stress PR’s drawbacks: fragmented party systems, coalition bargaining, and perceived loss of clear majority mandates.
  • Alternatives discussed: French two‑round system (criticized as still highly disproportional), STV with multi‑member districts, and MMP (mixed‑member proportional) as used in Germany and New Zealand.

US Context: Districts, Law, and Reform Obstacles

  • Multiple comments note the US Constitution doesn’t require districts, but federal law (2 U.S.C. § 2c) currently mandates single‑member districts; states cannot unilaterally adopt nationwide at‑large PR for the House.
  • Two‑party entrenchment is seen as the main blocker to reform; even referendum states would face united opposition from both major parties.
  • Some propose interstate compacts (e.g., California and Texas switching together) and also float bigger structural changes: vastly enlarging the House, term limits, “no‑budget, no‑reelection” rules, and even drawing Supreme Court panels by lot.

Icelandic System: Mechanics and Critiques

  • One commenter reconstructs the legal details: constituency seats plus a small fixed number of national “adjustment seats” allocated via D’Hondt to align national vote shares with seat shares; adjustment mandates are then assigned to specific constituencies by local quotients.
  • Critics argue this weakens the voter–MP geographic link and deters purely local parties; defenders reply that most seats are still constituency seats and “leftover” votes otherwise wasted get a second chance.
  • Malapportionment is widely criticized: the constitution only forces change once a constituency’s voters‑per‑seat ratio exceeds 2:1, so votes in some areas effectively count nearly twice as much.

Party-Centric vs Local Representation

  • Scandinavian systems are described as highly party‑focused: party lists and thresholds make party leadership decisive, and MPs usually follow party discipline, though formal independence exists.
  • There is debate over whether this is worse than US de‑facto party discipline plus primaries that incentivize extremists; some see the US already operating like a party‑list system in practice.
  • Thresholds and list mechanics make it hard for independents but easier than in FPTP for niche or regional parties to win at least one seat.