Hegseth had an unsecured internet line set up in his office to connect to Signal

How someone like this got the job

  • Many comments express disbelief that an unqualified media personality with no admin/Defense experience could become SecDef.
  • Explanations focus on party transformation over decades, erosion of checks and balances, and prioritizing loyalty over competence.
  • Some blame specific congressional leadership and long-term institutional decay; others point to voter choices in 2016/2024.

Severity of the “dirty line” and Signal use

  • One camp sees a major national security breach: circumvented Pentagon security, broke the air-gap culture, and used an unvetted channel for highly sensitive information.
  • Others argue the air gap for core systems likely remained intact; the line simply enabled Signal access much as a phone would, and the story may be hyped.
  • Several note that setting up such a line would have required internal IT cooperation and risk acceptance, not just a rogue cable.

Classified information, law, and records

  • Strong view: sharing real-time strike details (timing, aircraft, targets) is “obviously” highly classified; lower ranks would face career-ending punishment or prosecution.
  • Skeptical view: classification depends on formal guides and original classification authority; without seeing those, claims of illegality are “hit pieces.”
  • Separate concern: Signal’s disappearing messages and lack of centralized archiving appear designed to evade federal records-retention requirements.

Signal’s security and appropriateness

  • Technically, Signal is recognized as E2EE and robust, but several emphasize that for high-value targets, verification of keys and proper OPSEC are essential and likely weren’t done.
  • Critics stress that Signal is approved only for unclassified/personal use; using it for operational planning and high-level defense coordination bypasses vetted systems and SCIF practices.
  • Some suggest DoD should provide Signal-like tools on managed, records-compliant devices rather than driving shadow IT.

Broader institutional and political themes

  • Many see a double standard: enlisted personnel would be “burned at the stake” for similar conduct, while senior political appointees are shielded.
  • Others frame this as a natural outcome of the administration’s deep distrust of the “permanent bureaucracy,” leading to rejection of government devices and systems.
  • Debate extends into partisan attacks, foreign policy (especially Ukraine), and the general trend of governments conducting business via consumer messaging apps, often to avoid accountability.