Reports of the death of California High-Speed Rail have been greatly exaggerated

Status and symbolism of CAHSR

• Many see the project as a case study in US inability to build: huge spend, years of work, still no operable HSR segment.
• Others argue the hardest civil works (guideways, bridges, viaducts, grade separations) are largely what’s being built now; actually laying track and wiring is viewed as the easy, fast phase once that’s done.
• Even supporters concede that, at current pace, completion will be measured in decades and timelines already exceed major 20th‑century wars and megaprojects.

Technical vs. real bottlenecks

• Multiple commenters stress: physically building rail is a solved, highly automated problem globally.
• The real constraints cited: right‑of‑way fights, eminent domain politics, environmental litigation (esp. CEQA), shifting requirements from agencies, and fragmented stakeholder power.
• Grade separation is especially expensive and slow; even a single Caltrain station separation is projected near a billion dollars.

Routing and “train to nowhere” debate

• Major contention over routing through Central Valley cities vs. a straighter I‑5 corridor between LA and SF.
• Critics: detour adds cost and time, prioritizes small cities over the 20M+ in LA/Bay Area, and has delayed delivering the marquee SF–LA service.
• Defenders: I‑5 bypasses over a million residents; the chosen route only adds ~7% distance, still allows ~2h40m LA–SF (competitive by global HSR standards), and creates more intermediate markets and housing opportunities.
• Additional controversy over mountain crossings (Tehachapi vs Tejon) and the “blended” slow approach via Caltrain into SF and existing tracks into LA.

Governance, cost, and politics

• Recurrent themes: state‑level dysfunction, “infinite‑income” bureaucracy that endlessly revises specs, underbidding plus overruns, and incentives for consultants and contractors to prolong work.
• Some blame local NIMBYs, property rights litigation, and environmental law weaponized to block any change.
• Others point out California can build roads and freeways at huge scale; HSR’s problems are seen as political prioritization and coalition management, not raw capacity.

Planes, cars, and demand

• One camp believes SF–LA already has massive proven demand (dozens of daily flights) and is a textbook HSR corridor; HSR would be faster door‑to‑door, more comfortable, and would cannibalize most air traffic.
• Skeptics emphasize cheap, frequent flights, car‑centric cities with weak local transit (especially in Central Valley), and doubt that enough riders will choose expensive rail over cars/planes to justify costs.

Comparisons and alternatives

• Frequent comparisons to Europe, Japan, and China: they build faster and cheaper, often with stronger central authority and simpler legal environments.
• Brightline Florida is cited as a lower‑speed, imperfect but real private project that “just exists,” contrasted with CAHSR’s delays.
• Many argue California should have focused first on dense regional/urban rail (LA/SF metros, commuter lines) and/or a minimal, direct SF–LA spine, then expanded branches later.

Overall mood

• Thread tone skews pessimistic: even if CAHSR eventually runs, many expect it to be remembered as a cautionary tale of overreach, political fragmentation, and American infrastructure sclerosis.
• A minority maintain that, once any high‑speed trunk is operating, it will be normalized and valued like past “failed” megaprojects (Big Dig, bridges, dams) whose controversies have since faded.