Retailers will soon have only about 7 weeks of full inventories left

Visible shortages and supply-chain stress

• Commenters report already seeing gaps on big-box shelves and sharp drops in container traffic into major U.S. ports.
• Retailers are cutting orders because tariffs are due at import, not at sale; no one wants to pay huge, unstable duties on inventory they may not sell profitably.
• With long transit times and canceled sailings, several people expect specific goods to become simply unavailable for months, not just more expensive.

How the new tariffs work (and why they’re disruptive)

• The China tariff rate cited (~145%) radically raises landed costs, especially for low-margin or component-heavy goods.
• Tariffs are paid upfront at the port or via bonded warehouses; sudden increases can force firms to “pay twice” for already-purchased goods, straining cash flow.
• Because policy has whipsawed (on/off/paused, country lists changing, carve‑outs for favored sectors), companies can’t assume today’s rules will still apply by the time new factories or supply contracts come online.

Price, winners, and losers

• There’s extended back-and-forth over margin math: a 145% tariff on a $6 landed cost doesn’t require a 145% retail hike, but preserving percentage margins would still imply very large increases, especially on thin‑margin items.
• Many argue tariffs operate like a highly regressive national sales tax: rich households and investors have workarounds; low and middle incomes face higher prices on essentials and fewer exemptions.
• Others counter that cheap imports already concealed “true costs” (pollution, labor abuse, deindustrialization), and that some demand destruction is environmentally beneficial.

Short‑term pain vs. long‑term gain

• A minority sees potential strategic upside: force diversification away from China, rebuild domestic or allied supply chains, and gain wartime resilience.
• Most replies say the implementation guarantees more pain than gain: tariffs hit inputs and allies as well as Chinese finished goods, undercutting U.S. manufacturers and spooking capital investment.
• Several note that prior, narrower tariffs plus CHIPS/IRA-style subsidies were already drawing high‑end manufacturing back; the new blanket shock may discredit reshoring as an idea.

Political and institutional concerns

• Many stress that Congress originally delegated tariff powers but is now refusing to claw them back, making it complicit.
• The erratic, personality‑driven style (threats to firms, shifting exemptions, “11D chess” narratives) is seen as corrosive to rule‑of‑law trade and long‑term planning.
• Comparisons recur to Smoot‑Hawley, Brexit, and Soviet‑style shortages; some argue U.S. hegemony and dollar dominance are being actively eroded.

Public reaction and behavior

• Expectation of panic buying (toilet paper déjà vu) once shelves visibly thin; some are already stocking electronics, auto parts, medicines, and basics.
• Several argue voters only change course after feeling acute personal pain; others fear partisan media will successfully deflect blame and normalize the damage.