The Cannae Problem

Roman history and strategy nuances

• Several comments argue the piece oversimplifies Rome’s “awakening”: Fabius had already adopted delay-and-harass tactics before Cannae, but they clashed with Rome’s aggressive self-image and were politically unpopular.
• Others note Rome ultimately kept its aggressive identity, merely layering in Fabian elements; this mindset still served them well for centuries.
• Debate over why Rome won: manpower depth, ability to raise new armies, smarter post‑Cannae shadowing of Hannibal, and failure of Hannibal’s strategy to peel away enough Italian allies.
• Some stress that Hannibal couldn’t feasibly besiege Rome due to logistics and equipment; others emphasize his deliberate focus on isolating Rome from its allies.
• There’s correction and elaboration on Punic Wars: Rome beat Carthage’s navy by copying and improving Carthaginian ships; naval power (and later Roman naval failures) was crucial.

Limits and framing of the Cannae analogy

• Multiple posters think the article cherry-picks Cannae and underplays Rome’s eventual adaptation and victory, or other better-fitting disasters (e.g., Athenian Sicilian expedition).
• Others highlight that pincer tactics long predated Hannibal, so portraying them as shocking innovation is misleading.
• Some see the analogy as useful but historically shallow or even wrong in places.

Business and tech parallels (and pushback)

• Many connect the “mental model lock-in” idea to Kodak, Blockbuster, WordPerfect, Lotus, Symbian/Nokia, and energy incumbents; details offered on why incumbents struggled structurally, not just psychologically.
• Counterpoints: some outcomes weren’t inevitable; incumbents did try to adapt (e.g., Blockbuster’s digital push, Nokia’s technical efforts), but were out-executed or structurally constrained.
• Others argue the article ignores how today’s dominant tech firms rely on anti-competitive behavior and ad-based surveillance models, not just outdated mental maps.

Democracy, science, and institutions under strain

• Some extend the “Cannae moment” frame to science and democracy, citing examples like attempts to keep controversial candidates off ballots and governments “saving voters from themselves.”
• Replies invoke the paradox of intolerance and the need for democracies to defend themselves against actors who might not accept losing, with disagreement over where that line lies.

Modern military and organizational lessons

• Discussion of U.S. military training systems and doctrinal uniformity as a way to propagate new ideas once accepted.
• Others see a Cannae-like risk in slow, expensive U.S. procurement vs. cheap mass-produced drones in Ukraine, while noting the U.S. is at least conceptually adapting.
• Broader leadership takeaway repeated: the real failure is clinging to outdated mental maps; changing them is psychologically painful and organizationally hard.