Technical analysis of the Signal clone used by Trump officials

What TM SGNL Is and How It Likely Works

• TM SGNL is a modified Signal client distributed via MDM for organizations (gov, banks, corporates), not via app stores.
• It appears to be built from Signal’s open-source client with added message-archiving logic; TeleMessage also ships cracked WhatsApp and WeChat variants for the same purpose.
• Multiple commenters infer that the app simply sends plaintext copies of messages from the device to TeleMessage’s servers for archiving, making E2E encryption on the wire largely moot (“end-to-end cleartext”).
• The only visible UI difference: “Verify your TM SGNL PIN” instead of “Signal PIN”.

Security, Espionage, and the Israeli Vendor

• TeleMessage is run by people described as former Israeli intelligence officers, which some see as the central scandal: a foreign contractor mediating highly sensitive US communications.
• Others counter that the US routinely buys Israeli intel tech, and that the mere Israeli origin isn’t the “biggest part of the story,” though Israel is acknowledged as a serious counterintelligence concern.
• New reporting says TeleMessage’s systems were hacked, with alleged access to message contents, contact data, and backend credentials; commenters see this as turning a theoretical risk into an actual major breach.

Compliance vs. Signal’s Security Model

• Defenders argue the core driver is legal/records compliance: government and financial sectors must archive staff communications, which pure Signal cannot satisfy.
• TM SGNL’s pitch: keep using familiar consumer apps while making them “compliant” via centralized archiving.
• Critics argue this deliberately breaks Signal’s trust model by adding a third party who must now be trusted not to leak or mishandle archives.
• There is debate over whether this is “better than illegal deletion” or strictly worse than using official government E2E systems and segregated devices already available.

Signal Network, Unofficial Clients, and Disappearing Messages

• Signal discourages but cannot reliably block modified clients; as long as they speak the protocol, the server can’t distinguish them without heavy attestation/DRM.
• Other unofficial clients (e.g., Molly) already exist and use Signal’s network.
• Several participants emphasize that disappearing messages are a UX convenience, not a hard security guarantee—any recipient can archive or screenshot—even though many users misunderstand this.