India launches attack on 9 sites in Pakistan and Pakistani Jammu and Kashmir

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Scope of the Strikes & Immediate Military Claims

  • Initial assumption that fighting was “only Kashmir” is challenged: multiple reports in the thread say Indian strikes hit targets in both Pakistani-administered Kashmir and Punjab.
  • India frames the operation as “targeted strikes” on “terrorist infrastructure,” explicitly avoiding Pakistani military targets.
  • Pakistan claims to have shot down up to five Indian aircraft (including Rafales); India denies losses and says all pilots are accounted for.
  • Commenters note wildly fluctuating Pakistani claims (2→3→6→5 jets, captured soldiers then not), lack of credible imagery, and strong information control on both sides.
  • At least one Rafale loss is reported as confirmed via French and Western media; beyond that, most participants treat numbers as “fog of war” to be resolved only months or years later.

Escalation Risks: Conventional, Nuclear, and Water

  • Many see this as a familiar, limited India–Pakistan “tit-for-tat” cycle (similar to 2019), unlikely to become a full conventional war given both sides’ limited munitions and dependence on imports.
  • Others warn escalation could spiral via retaliation cycles or accidental incidents, especially with weak civilian control and factionalism inside Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.
  • Nuclear risk is heavily debated:
    • India’s “No First Use” policy is cited, but others note it has been politically hedged (“depends on circumstances”) and doctrine can change or be ignored.
    • Pakistan’s more opaque doctrine and state fragility raise concern about miscalculation or accidents.
    • Several argue both arsenals are sized such that a devastating but technically “survivable” exchange could tempt decision-makers in a crisis.
  • Suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and Indian manipulation of Chenab flows are seen as a particularly dangerous pressure point:
    • Short-term flow changes can wreck Pakistan’s crop cycles; longer-term diversion projects could be treated as a casus belli.
    • Some frame water leverage as deterrence; others say induced famine would force desperate escalation.

Terrorism, Deterrence, and Internal Politics

  • Broad agreement in the thread that the triggering Pahalgam attack was carried out by militants based in Pakistan (often named as LeT), with at least tacit support from elements of the Pakistani security establishment.
  • Multiple commenters emphasize Pakistan’s long history of “good vs bad terrorists”: groups targeting India or Afghanistan sheltered or tolerated; anti-state militants fought.
  • India’s strikes are interpreted by many as an attempt to:
    • Re-establish deterrence by imposing direct costs on Pakistan for cross-border terrorism.
    • Satisfy intense domestic pressure after a high-profile, religiously targeted attack.
  • Skeptics argue that hitting “terror camps” is mostly symbolic, doesn’t fundamentally change Pakistani behavior, and fits both governments’ need for performative strength.
  • In Pakistan, the army’s internal factional struggles (e.g., Munir vs Bajwa, role of ISI) are portrayed as a major driver of instability and sabotage of past normalization attempts.

Great-Power Influence & Proxy-War Framing

  • China’s role is heavily contested:
    • One camp sees Pakistan as highly dependent on China (CPEC, potential Gwadar base, Chinese enclaves) and unlikely to escalate without Beijing’s tacit approval.
    • Others argue this overstates Chinese control; Pakistan also relies on Turkey, Gulf states, and legacy NATO equipment, giving it options.
  • UAE and Saudi Arabia are repeatedly cited as having real leverage over both countries (trade, remittances, ownership of key Pakistani assets) and as effective past mediators of India–Pakistan de-escalation.
  • Debate over whether this could become a US–China proxy war:
    • Some see clear alignment trends (India tilting West, Pakistan/China deepening ties) and note US distraction (Ukraine, Yemen) as creating a “window.”
    • Others insist the conflict is fundamentally indigenous; India and Pakistan have ample reasons to fight without great-power prompting.

Information Control, OSINT, and Media Narratives

  • Several participants stress that Ukraine-style OSINT transparency is unlikely:
    • India is aggressively using new data-protection and national security laws, plus platform cooperation, to suppress battlefield leaks.
    • Pakistan is importing elements of China’s Great Firewall and can heavily clamp down on domestic social media if required.
  • As a result, both states are expected to overclaim successes; independent assessments may take years.
  • Indian and Pakistani media ecosystems are described as highly nationalistic, with Indian TV especially seen as beating “war drums” and framing the moment as an opportunity for a decisive blow over Kashmir.

Kashmir, Borders, and “Peace” Scenarios

  • Long, contentious subthread on whether any durable peace can be reached via:
    • Land swaps and drawing borders along rivers.
    • Ethnic or religious partition (“moving people around”) versus civic integration.
  • Some argue ceding Muslim-majority areas to Pakistan is politically impossible in India and risks Yugoslav-style ethnic cleansing.
  • Others emphasize that both states and large segments of their populations hold deep mutual hostility; elites on both sides derive domestic legitimacy from a permanent low-grade conflict.
  • Repeated examples are cited of serious India–Pakistan normalization efforts aborted by terrorist attacks or internal Pakistani power plays.

Economic & Human Costs

  • Pakistan is viewed as much more economically fragile (IMF bailouts, high food-price sensitivity), hence less able to sustain a large war—but also more vulnerable to water and trade coercion.
  • Some warn that widespread famine from water cuts or heavy bombing could push Pakistan’s leadership into irrational or desperate choices.
  • Multiple commenters stress that while elites may “benefit” politically from brief conflicts, ordinary civilians on both sides—especially in border regions of Jammu & Kashmir—bear the brunt of shelling, displacement, and long-term insecurity.