Improving Naval Ship Acquisition

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Carrier Radars, Redundancy, and Detectability

  • Debate over whether Ford-class carriers need high-end SPY‑6 variants versus simpler Nimitz-level sensors.
  • Pro-radar side: carriers must self-cue self-defense weapons, avoid single points of failure when E‑2s or escorts are down, and benefit from modular commonality (fewer radar modules than destroyers, but same tech).
  • Critics question: if escorts radiate anyway and satellites can see groups, does extra carrier radar justify cost, weight, and emissions risk? EMCON tactics are mentioned but not detailed.

Finding and Hitting Carrier Groups

  • Disagreement on how hard it is to locate carrier strike groups: some say modern satellites and shore-based systems make it easy; others emphasize the gap between rough location and weapons-quality tracks.
  • ASAT warfare and satellite vulnerabilities are seen as likely in any near‑peer conflict, though some argue “Kessler syndrome” risks are overstated.

Missiles, BMD, and Exo/Endo Intercept

  • Skepticism about specialized BMD ships on commercial hulls: defended footprint is geometry-limited, and staying “far back” may push them out of coverage.
  • Others counter that SM‑3 coverage from Aegis ships is already very large.
  • Long argument over midcourse vs terminal intercept and decoy discrimination; participants note this quickly bumps into classified territory.

Drones, Cheap Munitions, and Ship Survivability

  • Strong thread comparing Ukraine’s drone-driven land warfare changes to future naval combat: swarms of cheap air/sea drones and truck-launched missiles could overwhelm high-end ships.
  • Counterarguments:
    • Warships are extremely hard to sink; SINKEX data and historical damage-control performance cited.
    • Mission kills (e.g., destroying radars) may be easier and sufficient.
    • Truly naval-relevant drones (range, payload, EW-hardened) won’t be “$1k toys” and may converge toward cheap cruise missiles.
  • Proposed defenses: layered interceptors, lasers, high-power EW, and possibly RF/EMP-style effects; some participants doubt practicality of non-nuclear EMP.

Ship Roles, Distributed Forces, and LCS

  • Concern that distributed small combatants hit a “minimum viable warship” floor; LCS cited as under-armed for modern missile/drone threats.
  • Interlocking sensors and layered defenses from carriers, destroyers, and escorts are emphasized.
  • Some expect large ships to become “white elephants” in high-intensity wars; others insist they remain essential for troop/equipment movement and sea control.

Acquisition Structure and Design Ownership

  • Support for bringing more design in-house at NAVSEA, possibly reviving government yards to counter contractor lock-in and congressional incentives.
  • Others stress the real problem is endless, late-stage requirement changes by many stakeholders.
  • Critique of gigantic “one class for decades” programs: they drive gold‑plated requirements, fragile industrial bases, and political cancellations; advocates prefer many small ship classes, faster cycles, and modular interfaces.

Fleet Composition, Armament, and Purpose

  • Questions on why many surface ships are so air-defense heavy and light on offensive weapons; responses:
    • In the US model, carriers and the Air Force do most offense; destroyers are primarily escorts.
    • Many European fleets are doctrinally defensive.
  • Thread ends with the view that, whatever the doctrine, “we’re going to need more boats,” but of what type remains hotly contested.