How Ukraine’s killer drones are beating Russian jamming

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Laser and Kinetic Anti-Drone Defenses

  • Debate over lasers: some see them as promising (Silent Hunter, Iron Beam, 50–100 kW class systems with several‑km range, real-world intercepts reported); others note key limits—seconds of dwell time per target, difficulty engaging swarms, large power needs, and cost/complexity.
  • Reflective coatings and mirrors are discussed; consensus is that “mirror armor” is not a practical defense at modern military power levels.
  • Many argue area-effect systems (shotguns, flak, programmable airburst rounds like AHEAD, legacy AA guns such as L70/Zu‑23) are more cost-effective against swarms and cheap drones; India’s claimed success vs Turkish drones is cited.
  • Other concepts: anti-drone drones with nets, nets around infrastructure, microwave/SPL weapons, and autonomous shotgun- or cannon-based point defense.

Autonomy, AI, and Kill/No‑Kill Decisions

  • Large subthread on whether autonomous weapons making lethal decisions are worse than stressed human soldiers.
  • Pro‑automation side: decisions become reproducible and “debuggable,” humans already delegate to missiles, mines, and CIWS; human operators are remote and often desensitized anyway.
  • Skeptical side: software errors scale catastrophically, cannot grasp full context, and accountability becomes diffuse; historical human interventions that prevented nuclear war are cited.
  • Distinction drawn between:
    • Pre‑planned autonomous strike (like a cruise missile) vs.
    • Standing autonomous sentries able to decide when and whom to kill in complex civilian environments.

How the Ukrainian Deep-Strike Likely Worked

  • Attack reportedly used ArduPilot-based drones with autonomy for navigation plus human pilots for terminal guidance.
  • GPS near Russian bases is heavily jammed; commenters infer use of inertial/dead-reckoning plus visual navigation (terrain/landmarks, image recognition of aircraft) and possibly SLAM-like techniques.
  • Strong debate on how much “AI” was actually used: many think media overstated autonomy; videos show “no GPS lock” and per‑drone pilots, with drones staging from containers then being taken over.
  • For comms, several think Russian cellular networks or local mobile data relayed video back to operators in Ukraine; jamming deep inside Russia was likely minimal because such an attack wasn’t expected.

Drone Proliferation, Terrorism, and Civil Defense

  • Multiple commenters worry drones have “democratized” precision violence: cheap, anonymous, programmable, and scalable compared to traditional terrorism.
  • Speculative scenarios: pre‑staged autonomous drones hidden for months, drone attacks on markets or police, and vigilante uses against abusive authorities.
  • Others note that terrorism has remained rare despite easier attack methods; main constraint may be motivation and competence, not technology.
  • Civil defenses discussed: nets, building hardening, localized jammers, lasers to blind sensors, and kinetic interceptors—all seen as only partial and expensive solutions, hard to generalize to everyday public space.

Changing Military Balance and Geopolitics

  • The bomber strike is viewed as a major strategic blow: even 12 destroyed and dozens damaged from a relatively low-cost operation significantly degrades Russia’s second‑strike aviation and embarrasses its security services.
  • Discussion on why Russian bombers sat in the open (treaty visibility vs. corruption vs. incompetence); contrast with hangars/bunkers as cheap passive drone protection.
  • Some extrapolate to US and other powers: containerized drones could in principle threaten airbases or infrastructure across oceans; oceans and distance are no longer absolute protection.
  • Broader speculation that cheap, lethal drones favor defenders and smaller political units, possibly undermining traditional large-state power projection.

Electronic Warfare, Navigation, and Open Tech

  • EW described as GNSS jamming/spoofing and command-link disruption; countered by frequency hopping, multi‑band radios, optical/fiber links, and autonomous visual navigation.
  • Fiber‑optic “tethered” drones and optical/laser comms are noted as immune to RF jamming, forcing a shift away from pure EW solutions.
  • Open-source stacks (ArduPilot, off‑the‑shelf vision/ML modules) are central: originally hobby/industrial tools, now adapted quickly for military autonomy and GNSS‑denied operation.