We are no longer a serious country

Bond markets, tariffs, and Fed risk

• Commenters agree bond markets matter more than equities and that policy whiplash can erode confidence in the dollar.
• Some fear a future purge of Fed leadership and replacement with loyalists, seeing this as a 1930s-style risk.
• Others note markets have already forced the administration to back down on tariffs more than once, but opponents say the repeated attempts show persistence, not restraint.
• The “Taco Trade” is cited as an example of traders exploiting tariff-related volatility.

Is the administration “dumb” or strategically ruthless?

• One camp sees the administration as incompetent, pointing to poorly drafted executive orders, constitutional overreach, and weak implementation capacity.
• Another argues it is legally aggressive and coherent in its own goals: generating volatility, enriching insiders, expanding foreign-policy tools, and sending hardline messages to allies and rivals.
• Several emphasize that incompetence and danger can coexist; even “failed” orders still enable abuses by agencies.

Symbolism, bill naming, and seriousness

• Some dismiss focus on the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” name as trivial; only legal effects matter.
• Others see the name as emblematic of shallow branding and a broader lack of seriousness among enablers.
• There is debate over whether such branding is actually quite effective at agenda-setting and distraction.

US hegemony, rules-based order, and tariffs

• Critics argue US elites long ago embraced an exceptionalist “rules-based order” that mainly means “the US makes the rules,” with diplomacy hollowed out.
• Defenders counter that US security spending and interventions (e.g., protecting shipping lanes) deliver global public goods and soft power.
• Tariffs are viewed both as a dangerous form of saber-rattling that could undermine reserve-currency status and as a potent diplomatic lever.

Red vs blue politics and voter grievances

• There is disagreement over how much current policy is “red state,” but many see strong overlap on social conservatism, deregulation, tax cuts, and hostility to federal bureaucracy.
• Multiple comments probe why poorer red-state voters support such policies:
  • Some emphasize emotional grievance politics, scapegoating of out-groups, and delight in “punching down.”
  • Others note shared left–right grievances about elites, inequality, and loss of control, even if right-wing policy responses worsen those problems.
• Data and anecdote alike are cited that red states generally have worse socioeconomic outcomes, yet out-migration toward them suggests their policy mix still attracts many.

Interpreting the economic signals and Krugman’s framing

• Some see the divergence between interest rates and the dollar as historically worrying and consistent with the article’s thesis of declining seriousness.
• Others accuse the article (and the Financial Times chart it references) of cherry-picking time windows; longer-range plots paint a more ambiguous picture.
• A recurring frustration is the mix of valid concerns with rhetorical flourishes (e.g., title, bill name) that feel more like partisan doomsaying than sober risk assessment.

Decline, rhetoric, and public disengagement

• Historical declines (Venezuela, Argentina, Portugal, Rome) are invoked to argue rich countries can indeed fail and the US might be on that path.
• Another group criticizes absolutist claims like “no longer a serious country” as lazy, ahistorical, and unhelpful for finding solutions.
• Several comments highlight widespread public detachment from markets and policy, polarized information ecosystems, and the difficulty of finding non-partisan, analytically rigorous guidance on what genuinely matters.