Windows 10 spies on your use of System Settings (2021)
What the Settings traffic might be doing
- Several commenters suggest the observed requests look like:
- Network connectivity checks (similar to “ping google.com”).
- Version / update checks (the
2021.1019.1.0value is interpreted by multiple people as a date-like version string). - Fetching content for the Settings “banner” (Microsoft Rewards, OneDrive, Edge prompts, etc.), i.e., data from Microsoft to the user.
- Others argue that regardless of purpose, it is unexpected and unsolicited traffic and therefore functionally telemetry: it can timestamp your use of specific UI pages.
Telemetry vs spyware and trust in Microsoft
- One camp views Microsoft as fundamentally untrustworthy, citing past security failures, long history of anti-competitive behavior, and products like Recall. For them, any opaque data leaving the machine is “close to spyware.”
- Another camp defends Microsoft as unlikely to deploy “true spyware” (e.g., webcam capture), arguing they depend on business trust and that telemetry is anonymized and controlled.
- Several people counter that “trust” must be scoped: enterprises may trust Microsoft to ship patches, but not to respect privacy by default.
Ethics and purpose of telemetry
- Pro‑telemetry arguments:
- Common justification: understanding feature usage, deprecating unused features, prioritizing bug fixes, informing UX decisions.
- Claims that usage data answers “was this feature a good idea?” in ways pre‑release testing and surveys cannot.
- Telemetry is seen as acceptable if: opt‑in, clearly labeled, anonymous, and free of sensitive content (URLs, filenames, personal data).
- Anti‑telemetry arguments:
- “It’s not their computer”: any unsolicited call home is a privacy violation and extra attack surface.
- Even “anonymous” data can often be re‑identified via IP, TLS fingerprinting, etc.
- Additional code and networking add latency, complexity, and potential bugs; vendors should do proper testing or paid user studies.
- “Done right” is criticized as a moving target; users have little real control over what is collected.
Control, blocking, and technical limits
- Hosts‑file blocking is shown to be weak: tools and programs can bypass it via direct DNS queries, alternative resolvers, DNS‑over‑HTTPS, or hardcoded IPs.
- Firewalls are suggested as the only robust line of defense, though fully preventing connectivity without disabling the Internet is described as difficult.
Windows, privacy, and alternatives
- Multiple commenters describe Windows 10/11 as effectively ad/spyware and isolate it (guest networks, dual‑boot) or move to Linux.
- Others warn against pure speculation (e.g., Photos app “likely” exfiltrating facial data) and call for concrete network analysis rather than FUD.