Europe needs digital sovereignty – and Microsoft has just proven why

US Sanctions, Microsoft, and Extraterritorial Control

  • Core concern: US sanctions effectively give Washington a lever over any organization using US tech, anywhere.
  • Example discussed: Microsoft cut the ICC chief prosecutor off its services due to US sanctions; some articles clarify this was the individual account, not the whole ICC, but critics say this distinction is PR spin.
  • Commenters note the broader sanctions “ecosystem”: banks and other intermediaries often comply even outside the US, amplifying US control.
  • The CLOUD Act is cited as formalizing US claims over data held abroad by US companies.

Digital Sovereignty vs Practical Dependence

  • Many argue dependence on US cloud, smartphones, and platforms makes Europe structurally vulnerable; similar logic is extended to Linux and other US-led open source projects.
  • Others counter that true sovereignty means self-hosting and running FOSS on owned hardware and networks, not merely “European-branded” cloud.
  • Email is used as a test case: calls for strong EU/FOSS stacks (clients, servers, webmail); debates over Thunderbird’s quality vs Outlook and the importance of usable UX.
  • Tuta’s legal obligation to enable targeted access to unencrypted mail in Germany is discussed; some see this as inevitable without end-to-end encryption, others as a trust issue.

EU Regulation, Innovation, and AI

  • Many see the EU’s heavy, early regulation (e.g. AI Act, data rules) as slowing AI and data-driven innovation versus US/China deregulation.
  • Others stress that sacrificing privacy and rights for speed is not acceptable, but concede this carries strategic risk.
  • Over‑regulation, labor protections, and limited equity compensation are cited as factors pushing ambitious founders and engineers toward the US.

Chips, Energy, and Industrial Base

  • For “AI sovereignty,” commenters list needs: lithography, wafers, GPUs, software, and cheap energy.
  • Europe is seen as strong in lithography and some materials (ASML, optics, chemicals) but weak in leading-edge fabs, GPUs, hyperscale cloud, and cheap power.
  • There is argument over whether ASML gives real geopolitical leverage, given US IP dependencies and the lack of EU top-tier fabs.
  • Energy policy splits opinions: some say Europe chose “degrowth” and external fossil dependence; others highlight nuclear, renewables, and future fusion work.

Government Efforts and Their Limits

  • Examples of EU action: Gaia‑X, Sovereign Cloud Stack, NGI-funded FOSS projects, and proposals for EU DNS.
  • Critiques: many initiatives are viewed as bureaucratic subsidies with little real adoption; institutions and businesses still default to Microsoft, Oracle, US clouds, and US collaboration tools.
  • A recurring theme is that writing grants is easier than changing procurement habits, culture, or risk models.

Structural Issues and Proposed Paths

  • Thread notes long‑running European weaknesses: fragmented markets, risk‑averse engineering culture, tight economic integration with the US, and failure to lead prior tech waves.
  • Suggested responses:
    • Systematic preference for EU/FOSS in public procurement and infrastructure.
    • Building polished, user‑friendly FOSS stacks under EU sponsorship (e.g. browsers, office/email, comms).
    • More on‑prem/self‑hosting for critical services.
    • A “non‑aligned” stance between US and China, extracting concessions from both without full dependence on either.