Officials concede they don't know the fate of Iran's uranium stockpile

Use of Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence

• Some wonder why Israel hasn’t used nuclear weapons on Iran, arguing Iran lacks a credible nuclear counterstrike and is incentivized to seek nukes.
• Others counter that nuclear use would trigger catastrophic diplomatic and strategic fallout: loss of Western backing, global norm-breaking, and risk of copycat strikes (Russia–Ukraine, China–Taiwan, DPRK–ROK).
• There is debate whether the US would ever abandon Israel over a nuclear strike; several argue support would continue despite public condemnation.
• A claimed Pakistani pledge to nuke Israel if Israel nukes Iran is mentioned; commenters dispute its credibility and note it would risk US retaliation.

Iran’s Stockpile, Facilities, and Rebuild Risk

• Confusion in the thread over what was hit: the article is about the stockpile, but commenters note Fordo, a key enrichment plant, took heavy damage yet may not be fully destroyed.
• Some argue moving centrifuges is almost as hard as building a new site, so quick reconstitution is implausible; others think hidden or undiscovered facilities are a real possibility.
• Several emphasize that going from 60% to weapons-grade is relatively fast once you have sufficient infrastructure, so 60% stockpile plus any surviving capacity is dangerous.

Monitoring, Detection, and “Lost” Uranium

• Pre-deal IAEA cameras and sensors under the 2015 nuclear agreement were removed after the US withdrawal, reducing visibility.
• Commenters note uranium’s weak radiation and ease of shielding make remote tracking of a 400 kg stockpile unrealistic; physical volume is small but handling and safety are nontrivial.
• Advanced tools like antineutrino detectors are mentioned, but those apply to reactors, not static uranium stockpiles.

US War Powers and “Not a War With Iran” Framing

• Extensive debate over presidential versus congressional authority: formal war declarations ended in 1942, but Congress has repeatedly authorized “military action” instead.
• The War Powers Act and AUMF are cited as legal bases for unilateral strikes up to time limits, with concern that Congress has effectively abdicated its role.
• Some see the “we’re at war with Iran’s nuclear program, not Iran” line as legal/political wordplay akin to “special military operation” rhetoric elsewhere.

JCPOA, Trump Withdrawal, and Responsibility

• Multiple commenters state IAEA found Iran compliant with the JCPOA’s low-enrichment limits until the US unilaterally exited and reimposed sanctions.
• Critics of the deal argue it “bribed” a regional troublemaker just to pause bomb-making; defenders argue graded sanctions relief is exactly how nonproliferation diplomacy works.
• There is broad agreement that Trump’s withdrawal significantly intensified today’s crisis, though some justify current bombing as a necessary non-diplomatic solution.

Historical Analogies, Imperialism, and Domestic Politics

• Many draw explicit parallels to the Iraq WMD fiasco: weak or politicized intelligence, media cheerleading, and risk of another Middle East quagmire.
• “American imperialism” is discussed as lived reality in places like Latin America, versus an ideological buzzword inside the US.
• Some argue US and Israeli moves are driven partly by embattled leaders seeking “wartime” legitimacy. Others focus on US domestic polarization, MAGA support for Trump, and a pattern of public opinion flipping from “end endless wars” to backing new conflicts.
• Ukraine is cited as a proxy-war success against Russia, but also as an example of sacrificing another nation’s population for great-power aims; views diverge on whether that logic is being reapplied to Iran.