I fought in Ukraine and here's why FPV drones kind of suck

Technical characteristics & control

• Commenters clarify that “FPV goggles” are simple video displays, not VR; some suggest AR glasses but others argue pilots should be fully focused and physically protected instead.
• Auto‑stabilizing flight modes exist but frontline FPV drones often run stripped‑down, cheap stacks (no GPS/compass), prioritizing cost and agility over ease of use.

Cost-effectiveness vs other weapons

• Much debate centers on whether 20–40% mission “success” is bad or actually excellent once compared to artillery or mortars, which also have low per‑round hit probabilities.
• FPVs are likened to very cheap, short‑range, man‑portable precision munitions; Javelin/TOW/Spike and Switchblade are far more capable but hundreds of times more expensive and production‑limited.
• Against armor, small FPV warheads often disable via soft spots (tracks, engine, hatches) rather than penetrate main armor; multiple hits may be needed, which drives up real cost per kill and logistics (how many drones a unit can carry).

Countermeasures, EW, and fiber drones

• Jamming and frequency congestion are major issues: analog, unencrypted FPV links share a few crowded channels for both sides.
• Fiber‑optic‑guided drones are a key adaptation: immune to RF jamming, used especially for hunting jammers and high‑value targets, but cables can snag, be traced, or theoretically cut, and generate massive lengths of battlefield litter.
• Some say Ukraine uses fewer fiber drones due to industrial limits and trade‑offs; Russia is reported to field more and combine fiber and radio platforms.

Battlefield role and impact

• Several argue FPVs are best seen as complements to mortars/artillery, not replacements: drones spot, confirm, and sometimes execute precise strikes where indirect fire would be wasteful or impossible.
• Others emphasize psychological and logistical effects: constant drone presence forces dispersion, complicates vehicle movement within 5–10 km of the front, and creates an “area denial” environment.

Autonomy and future evolution

• Many think the article underestimates future potential: off‑the‑shelf CV/“terminal guidance” boards already exist; cheap embedded compute (phones, Pi‑class boards) could enable semi‑autonomous terminal homing.
• Counter‑arguments stress cost and integration complexity: adding AI and robust comms quickly pushes a $500 disposable drone toward multi‑thousand‑dollar loitering munitions that already exist.
• There is visible concern about swarms and autonomous “Slaughterbots”‑style systems, and about how cheaply such systems could be mass‑produced.

Terrain, doctrine, and limits

• Several note FPVs are especially effective over flat, open terrain (as in much of Ukraine/Russia); dense forests, mountains, and heavy jamming reduce their value, shifting advantage back to artillery, mortars, and ISR drones.
• Drones are widely seen as transformative but not “war‑winning” by themselves; they are another layer in a classic arms race of weapon vs countermeasure.

Ethics and information security

• A side thread debates whether FPV strikes on unarmed soldiers are war crimes; commenters cite humanitarian law distinctions between combatants, POWs, and those hors de combat.
• Some worry the article leaks useful operational statistics; others respond that both sides already know these realities from their own programs.