MCP-B: A Protocol for AI Browser Automation

What MCP-B Does

  • Extends Model Context Protocol into the browser: a site embeds an MCP server in its JS, exposing functions (“tools”) that an AI client can call.
  • A browser extension (the MCP-B client) discovers these tools and lets any compatible AI model use them, so sites don’t need to build their own AI UIs.
  • Emphasis is on deterministic function calls over browser events instead of DOM parsing or vision.

Comparison to Existing Browser Automation

  • Different from Selenium/Playwright: those automate the UI by driving the DOM; MCP-B lets the app author publish higher-level, semantic actions (e.g., “add to cart”) directly.
  • Compared to test attributes or OpenAPI/Swagger: those are static and require prior knowledge; MCP-B advertises available tools dynamically at connection time via a standard protocol.
  • Some argue a generic Swagger MCP client might cover similar ground but tool overload and naming clashes are cited as issues.

Use Cases and Potential

  • Suggested uses: simplifying complex SaaS/admin UIs, purchases or multi-step flows, cross-tab workflows (e.g., moving content from Google Docs to a CMS), accessibility/assistive automation.
  • “Bring your own model” is attractive to app developers who don’t want to own chat/agent infrastructure.

Adversarial / Arbitrary-Site Automation

  • Discussion of injecting MCP servers via user scripts or dev builds to turn any site into an MCP target, framed as “adversarial interoperability.”
  • Some think this will be the main long-term value, as many businesses won’t voluntarily expose revenue-critical flows.

Burden on Site Owners & Ecosystem

  • Concerns that expecting every site to build MCP endpoints is unrealistic; more value if tools can be autogenerated from existing apps/frameworks.
  • Predicts platform-level integrations (WordPress, Shopify, Rails/Next/Laravel plugins) and directories/discovery standards.

Security & Privacy Concerns

  • Heavy debate around auth and cross-origin risks: an agent tied to a browser session can access whatever the user can, and may leak data between sites via prompt injection.
  • Suggestions include treating agents as untrusted delegates with least-privilege access, consent prompts when new domains/tools are used, and mechanisms to avoid exposing raw sensitive data to the model.
  • Some see MCP-B as weakening the web’s same-origin expectations if not carefully constrained.

Debate on MCP vs “Smarter” LLMs

  • One camp argues we should focus on LLM self-discovery and autonomous tool creation; another says current models are too unreliable/expensive for that, so explicit protocols like MCP-B are a practical bridge.

Business Incentives & Adoption

  • Skepticism that many commercial sites will ship MCP-B, likening the trajectory to REST APIs or RSS: powerful for users but misaligned with ad/engagement models.
  • Counterpoint: if enough users value “AI-ready” experiences, market pressure could drive adoption despite bot-abuse and anti-scraping concerns.