Drones Are Key to Winning Wars Now. The U.S. Makes Hardly Any

Battlefield impact and Ukraine context

• Several commenters argue drones are now central to attrition in Ukraine, accounting (per linked sources) for a large share of casualties and making massed troop or armor concentrations nearly impossible.
• FPV kamikaze drones and cheap quadcopters are used to spot for artillery, finish off wounded vehicles and soldiers, lay mines, and hit strategic assets like bombers and tanks.
• Others note drones have not yet “won” a war; they have produced stalemate and are “key to not losing,” but boots and armor are still required to hold territory.

Cost, scale, and industrial model

• Strong emphasis that small FPV drones are devastating partly because they’re extremely cheap ($300–$500 range in Ukraine) yet destroy far more expensive systems, especially compared to missiles like Javelin or ATACMS.
• Concern that once specialized defense contractors dominate, prices will inflate and erase the cost advantage, repeating the existing military‑industrial markup cycle.
• Some see US production as misaligned: making few, very expensive drones instead of mass “garage‑band,” semi-disposable platforms.

Countermeasures, jamming, and autonomy

• Debate over how vulnerable cheap drones are to electronic warfare: jamming can neutralize many radio/GPS‑dependent systems, but fiber‑optic‑tethered drones and autonomous/AI “terminal guidance” are spreading.
• Fiber drones avoid jamming but have range/handling issues (snagging, limited loitering) and leave physical debris.
• Many think fully or partially autonomous killer drones are 1–3 years away and essentially inevitable; others stress autonomy will raise costs.

Airpower, doctrine, and generalization

• Several caution against extrapolating Ukraine too far: drones matter so much there because neither side has a viable air force or SEAD capability.
• View that in a classic high‑end conflict, manned aircraft and long‑range kill chains still dominate; drones become another smart munition layer, not a replacement.
• Counter‑view: air superiority has repeatedly failed to deliver decisive victories (Vietnam, current insurgencies), while drones can be manufactured and deployed in highly decentralized fashion.

Industrial base, China, and supply chains

• Multiple comments argue wars are ultimately about manufacturing capacity; China’s scale and its role in supplying both Russia and Ukraine are highlighted as a looming strategic problem.
• US dependence on Chinese electronics and EV/robotics supply chains is seen as a vulnerability for drone and weapons production. Some propose rebuilding a North American (US–Canada–Mexico) industrial ecosystem.

Naval and other domains

• Naval drones are noted as increasingly important: Ukraine’s sea drones forced parts of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to relocate and have sunk or damaged ships, though their overall impact is debated.
• Underwater and submarine‑related drones face major communications constraints, pushing toward autonomy and sensor networks rather than live remote control.

Overall assessment of drones’ significance

• Consensus that drones are now a crucial tool and major casualty producer, especially in peer or near‑peer land wars without air supremacy.
• Disagreement on whether they are “key to winning” versus one element in a combined‑arms, high‑tech, high‑manufacturing struggle that still depends heavily on artillery, airpower, and industrial depth.